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No. 74-1302 
DUNLOP (Sec'y of Labor) 
v. 
TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO. et al. 
No. 74-1316 
TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO. 
V. 
DUNLOP 
App from USDC (E.D.Ky.) 
3-judge Ct (mem opn) 
(Lively; Moynahan, Hermansdorfer) 
Federal/ Civil Timely 
App from USDC (E.D. Ky.) 
3-judge Ct (mem opn) 
(Lively; Moynahan, Hermansdorfer) 
Federal/ Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: The Govt appeals from a dee.is ion of the USDC 
holding two provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act uncon-
-----.; 
stitutional. The court held that the question was "not precluded' 
two 
by this Court's recent decision in National Independent Coal 
Operator's Assoc. v. Brennan, No. 73-1902 (October 29, 1974), 
summarily affirming 372 F.Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1974). 
FACTS: Plaintiffs below (a group of coal mine operators) 
brought a blunderbuss attack on the 1972 federal legislation 
known as the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §901 et seq. 
They characterized the legislation as an unconstitutional attempt 
to grant "reparations" to "financially distressed ex-miners 
(and their families or survivors) who worked in coal mines 
in years past and did not have the benefit of workmen's compen-
sation coverage." Plaintiffs criticized Congress' choice of 
a "profoundly arbitrary and irrational scheme" of shifting the 
burden of suppo:r:ting "inactive miners" to the industry and 
pointed to Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 
330 (1935), for support. 
In addition, plaintiffs attacked the eligibility require-
ments of the statute which used a number of "presumptions" for 
determining whether a miner was "totally disabled" from a "work 
related" case of pneumoconiosis (black lung). They argued 
that such presumptions violated due process because they were 
effectively rendered irrebutable by practicality and by other 
provisions of the law and regulations promulgated thereunder. 
See Owens v. Roberts, 377 F.Supp. 45, 49-50 (M.D. Fla. 1974) 
(state welfare law fraud provision). 
The USDC examined plaintiffs' generalized attack on the 
statute and found no merit to the claim that the act imposed 
three 
liability for "remote claims" where the coal industry did not 
insure against that particular risk because it was unknown. 
The court concluded that Congress' policy decision to impose 
liability for "remote claims" was not unreasonable and noted 
that plaintiffs had not cited to any authority showing that 
such liability violates constitutional safeguards. The court 
distinguished the Alton case on the grounds that the act met 
the requirement of linking liability to disability related to 
prior employm~nt. 
The USDC, however, had more trouble with plaintiff's ---attack on the statutory presumptions of the act under §92l(c). In 
particular, it .found §92l(c)(3) and §92l(c)(4) violative of due 
process. Those provisions state as follows: - " ( 3) if ·a miner is suffering or suffered from a 
chronic dust disease of the lung which (A) when diag-
nosed bv chest roentgenogram, yields one or more large 
opaciti;s (greater than one centimeter in diar1:eter) 
and would be classified in category A, B, or C m the 
International Classification of Radiographs of Pneurno-
conioses by the International Labor Organization, (B) 
when diagnosed by biopsy or autopsy, yields massive 
lesions in the lung, or ( C) when diagnosis is made by 
either means would be a condition which could reason-
ably be exp~cted to yield results described in clause 
(A) or (B), then there shall be an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that he is to~ally dis_abled due to pneumo-
coniosi s 017hat at the time of lus death he was totally 
clisabled by pneurnoconiosis, as the case may be; and 
" ( 4) if a miner was employed for fiftc~n y<'ars ~r 
more in one or more und<'rgronnd coal mmes, and_ if 
there is a chest roentgC'nogram submitted in connec_bo_n 
with such miner's ... claim under this title, and 1~ 1s 
interpreted as negative with respect _to the i_-eqmre-
ments of paragraph (3) of this sulisccbon, an<l if oth_er 
evidence d('monstrates the exist0nce of a totally <l1s-
( abling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, tlwn 
there sl1all he a relmttablc pr0sumption that sucl1 minPr 
is totally disabl ed due to pncnmoconiosis, or that at 
the time of this death he was totally <lisahled by 
pneumoconiosis .... The Secretary may rebut surl1 
presumption only by establishing that (A) such mi1wr 
docs not, or did not, have pneurnoconiosis, or (B) his 
respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arisP-
out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal 
mine." 
four 
The court concluded as to §92l(c)(3) that it was "a departure 
from the overall pattern of the Act which makes the existence 
of both the disease and disability two (2) separate factors 
which must be established before liability is imposed ." The 
USDC pointed to the language of §902(f) which defined " total 
disability" as the point "when pneumoconiosis prevents him from 
engaging in gainful employment" and held that §92l(c)(3) was 
"unreasonable ancl arbitrary" and violative of due process "in 
precluding the opportunity to present evidence as to the effect 
of a chronic dust disease upon an individual 'in determining 
whether or not he is disabled." 
The USDC then appears to have read §92l(c)(4) as limiting 
the evidence that a coal operator may introduce to refute the 
fact of disability. The court emphasized that pneumoconiosis 
is n~t disabling ~ ~ and held that requiring evidence that 
the miner did not have the disease "is irrational where liability 
is not predicated on the mere presence of the disease, but 
rather on a complicated state of the disease." In addition, 
the court found it incompatible with the proviso of §932(c) --
that exempts an operator from liability for black lung disability 
"which did not arise, at least in part, out of employment in 
five 
such mi ne during the period when it was operated by such oper-
ator . " The court held that there was "no rational basis" for 
making the operator prove that the disability did not arise from 
the miner's employment. Rather, the Govt must prove the operator 
liable for his mine's involvement in the disease. 
CONTENTIONS: The Govt (appellant in No. 74-1302) urges 
that both provisions are valid legislative judgments. As to 
the "irrebu t able presumption" of disability in §92l(c)(3), the 
Govt points out that pneumoconiosis,when it reaches the advanced 
or "progressive" stage in which massive fibrosis and lesions 
are present, is terminal and irreversible even though there 
may be only mild pulmonary changes and little or no disability 
in some patients. when detected. The Govt argues that it was a 
proper legislative judgment to categorize such patients as 
among those who should be compensated even before the disease 
has reached its final stage so that they are completely unable 
to work. Calling these patients "totally disabled" is, the Govt 
I argues, nothing more than a "shorthand method of expression" which takes into account the inevitability of the disease. 
As to the limitation on rebuttal evidence in §92l(c)(4), 
the Govt argues that the USDC misread the statute. The presump-
tion does not go into effect until the claimant shows: (1) 15 or 
more years or mine employment, and (2) a totally disabling 
respiratory or pulmonary impairment." Only when these are 
present does the statute presume the existence of pneumoconiosis; 
nothing precludes a coal operator from introducing evidence 
Six 
that the p r econdition of "<lia bility" does not exist. The Govt also criticizes 
the USDC' s conclus ion that i t is improper to place a burden of proving no 
employm ent i n the coa l mines, but the Govt' s argument is quite incompre-
hensible . 
In re sp onse to the Govt' s arguments, plaintiffs suggest that the 
"correc tness of the District Court's conclusion ... is manifest," since 
they are "classic examples of a legislative attempt to enact into existence 
facts tha t do not exist in actuality." Plaintiffs (as appellants in No. 74-1316) 
raise their general attack on the entire Black Lung Act, making a number of 
policy arguments (it will cost too much; employers will be less likely to hire 
older workers) as well as their constitutional claim that they are denied due 
proces s by a "retroactive" and "constitutionally suspect departure from 
_ traditional compensation theory." 
The Govt in response to the claims in No. 74-1316 urges that the 
Court 's decision in National Independent Coal Operators Ass 'n v. Brennan, 
No. 73-1902 (Oct. 29, 1974, forecloses any further attack on the validity 
of the statutory scheme. 
DISCUSSION: Regarding plaintiffs' broadside attack on the statutory 
method of compensating disabled miners, the matter seems clearly to have 
been resolved by National Independent Coal Operators as one which should 
rest with Congress. As to the "presumption" issues, the Govt's is most 
persuasive that § 921 (c) (3)' s inclusion of terminal but not yet disabled miners 
under the definition of "totally disabled" is merely a policy choice within 
Congress' purview. The Govt is somewhat less convincing regarding the 
Seven 
lim i tations on rebuttal of § 921 (c)(4), partly because the USDC I s discussion 
of this p rovi s ion is so confus ing. All that provision does is to presume that 
a long - t erm c oal miner with a disabling lung disease does in fact have 
pneumoc onios i s -- a presumption which can be rebutted by the operator's 
showing that i t isn't pheumoconiosis at all or that it was acquired somewhere 
other tha n in the coal mines. The provision doesn't forbid an attack on the 
initial pa rt of the presumption (e.g., the fact that it is 11 disabling 11 ), nor does 
it r equi re t he operator to carry a burden of proving the negative of something 
that the G ovt should prove. Nothing in the statute, including §932(c), gives 
an operator t he right to compel the Govt to prove that the disease came from 
the w orker 1 s m ining experience. 
The pr oof from Congressional hearings was that miners acquired black 
lung dis ease working in the mines; it hardly seems startling that Congress 
chose to permit various inferences from such circumstances to attain the 
status of r ebuttable presumptions which shift to the operator the burden of 
proving his defense under the statute. It appears that the USDC has taken 
what are at most slight, superficial inconsistencies between certain 
provisions in the act and elevated them to the level of constitutional violation 
without due regard for legislative policy choices. Plenary consideration does 
not seem necessary, and summary reversal may be in order. This should 
clear up any confusion as to the meaning of National Independent Coal 
Operators. 
There are motions to affirm. 
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Dunlop v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Company 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Company v. Dunlop 
I would reverse No. 74-1302 and affirm No. 74-1316, 
deciding both cases for the Government. This is another 
example of a circuitously drafted statute that contains a 
few ambiguities and apparent contradictions. I do not, on 
balance, think that any of these ris~to the level of a due 
process violation. 
Congress apparently went to gr eat lengths to impose 
the major share of the burden of Black Lung benefits upon the 
federal government. The imposition of liability on mine 
operators is retroactive only insofar as operators are made 
responsible for payments to miners who contracted the disease 
during their employment, left work before the 1969 effective 
date of the Act, and discovered their disability after 
June 30, 1970. As the SG points out, tort liability could be ~ 
established for this class under settled principles of 
law. 
The presumptions are a bit more troublesome. 
Weinberger v. Salfi, cited by the SG, is of limited relevance, -
2. 
IJ 
since this Act creates criteria for the imposition of burdens·. 
on private parties, rather than criteria for the receipt of -
funds from the public treasury. But "rationality" is the 
standard to apply in any case and was the test adopted by 
the district court. The test, described in my memo in -~ 
Lavine v. Milne, is whether the presumption is a rational ---response to a rationally perceived problem. I do not think 
the presumptions fail that test. 
Put most persuasively, the operators' argument 
is that Congress failed to articulate the problem that would 
support the inferences made. That is, Congress could have 
said that it intended to provide compensation for all miners 
who have complicated pneumoconiosis (not just those totally 
disabled by it) and all those who were totally disabled or 
whose decedent was killed by a serious respiratory ailment 
that has not been proved to be something other than pneumoconiosis. 
e ,1 e. n 
If this were the express Congressio~al purpose, the presumptions 
I\ ---found unconstitutional by the district court would be rational. 
The argument is that Congress' express purpose here was only 
to compensate cases of total disability or death by 
pneumoconiosis and that the presumptions are therefore 
overbroad. 
There may be a legal argument to be made for 
striking these presumptions down on the basis that they do not 
suit the Act's expressed statutory purpose. But this seems 
a silly gesture. Congress could easily remedy the problem 
simply by mouthing the right formula. Moreover, there is 
sufficient evidence that Congress rationally perceived that 
overinclusiveness was necessary if the express purpose of 
the Act was to be effectuated. The SG and the UMW amicus 
briefs do a good job of describing the problems to which 
Congress was responding. And there appears to be 
support in the legislative history for the proposition that 
Congress deliberately decided to be overinclusive and to 
3. 
resolve doubts in favor of the miners in order to fully effecuate 
the purpose of compensating those totally disabled by the 
disease and the families of the deceased. 
The apparent inconsistency in the Act may Be due 
in part to the fact that it was formed in two stages. It was 
originally passed in 1969, and amendments were made in 1972. 
The amendments were made because experience in the administration 
of the Act indicated that somewhat loose, even overinclusive 
presumptions were necessary if miners were to be compensated 
to the extent desired by Congress. 
uniJeC\l·if ,~d t5p1to1'1~ 
It was necessary to presume that aJ\disease is pneumoconiosis 
I\ 
because of the inadequacy of past records (particularly crucial 
when the question is survivor's benefits and the suffering 
miner cannot be examined) and because medical techniques are 
not sufficiently advanced to distinguish all cases of pneumoconiosis 
from other respiratory disease. The presumption in§ 921(c)(3), 
of total disability from the presence of the disease in a 
complicated form~ is rational because the disease is in fact 
wi II i,eeirm~ 
4. 
irreversible and always totally disabling. The point at which 
C\Cfw>.\l~ (\ 
it becomes so is hard to define. 
/\ 
The SG convincingly demonstrates that the district 
court's conc lusion that§ 92l(c)(4)'s limitations on rebuttal 
evidence were unconstitutional was based on an erroneous 
reading of the statute. Since the section is premised on a 
demonstration that the miner is totally disabled, liability 
is not predicated on a mere finding of disease. Nor is the 
- + he. o pe;ro..l-o1" must p'l"o v e. 
limitation on rebut table evidence" · , that the miner's 
impairment did not arise out of employment in '~'mine -
unconstitutional. Section 932(c) imposes a proviso on all 
liability for benefit payments; t hat proviso, which overriaes 
§ 92l(c)(4), allows an operator to escape liability for benefits 
if the death or disability did not arise, at least in part, 
out of employment in a mine operated by him. 
Chris 
-
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Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Dunlop 
I expressed some concern about the presumption in§ 921(c)(3), 
which reads as follows (with my organization for clarity's sake): 
" ... if a miner is suffering or suffered from a chronic dust 
disease of the lung which 
(A) when diagnosed by chest roentgenogram, yields one 
or more large opacities (greater than one centimeter 
in diameter) and would be classified in category 
A, B, or C in the International Classification of 
Radiographs of Pneumoconioses by the International 
Labor Organization, 
(B) when diagnosed by biopsy or autopsy,~ yields massive 
lesions in the lung, 
or (e) when diagnosis is made by either means, would be a 
condition which could reasonably be expected to yield 
results described in clause (A) or (B), 
then there shall be an irreb~ttable presumption that he is 
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time 
of his death he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, as the 
case may be; ... " 
I was concerned about the irrebutable presumption that the disease 
was pneumonconiosis; no evidence that it was not will be received. 
But, as I told you, I think this is not unreasonable because Congress 
could not determine an accurate and commonly accepted definition 
of the disease. In effect, this serves as a definition. 
for another reason --
The court below found this presumption unconstitutional/because 
it irrebutably presumed disability from x evidence of the existence 
of disease. I addressed that point in my memo -- I think it reasonable 
given the fact that the disease is always irreversible once it 
becomes chronic. If the conditions described are met, I xxx take 
it, Congress has concluded that total disability will follow 
inevitably; XKB there is medical testimony to support that assessment. 
( 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF.8. 
Nos. 74-1302 AND 74-1316 
., \'\ W.. J. Usery, Jr., Secretary 
of the United States De-
partment of Labor, 
et al:, Appellants, . 
7:1-'-1302 v . . 
T,urner Elkhorn Mining 
Company et aL 
T.urner Elkhorn Mining 
Company et al., . 
Appellants, 
7+-1316 v. 
W: J. Usery, Jr., Secretary 
of the United States De-
partment of Labor, 
et al. 
On Appeals from the United . 
States District Court for 
the Eastern District of -
Kentucky. 
[April -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Twenty-two coal mine operators (the "Operators") 
brought this suit to test the constitutionality of certain 
aspects of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and 
Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the 
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 901 et seq. ( 1970 ed. and Supp. IV) . The Operators, 
potentially liable under the amended Act to compensate 
certain miners, former miners, and their survivors for 
death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis arising out 
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2 USERY v. TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO. 
junctive relief against the Secretary of Labor and the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who are 
responsible for the administration of the Act and the 
promulgation of regulations under the Act. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, a three-judge 
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, 
convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284, 
I found the amended Act constitutional on its face, except in regard to two provisions concerning the determination of a miner's total disability due to pneumoconiosis. The 
Court enjoined the Secretary of Labor from further ap-
plication of those two provisions. 385 F. Supp. 424 
U974). After granting a stay of the three-judge court's 
order, 421 U. S. 944 (1975), we noted probabl-e jurisdic-
tion of the cross-appeals. 421 U. S. 1010 (1975). We 
conclude that the amended Act, as interpreted, is consti .. 
tutionally sound against the Operators' challenges. 
I 
I Coal workers' pneumoconiosis-black lung disease-
affects a high percentage of American coal miners with 
severe, and frequently crippling, chronic respiratory im ... 
pairment.1 The disease is caused by long-term inhala-
tion of coal dust. 2 Coal WO!fers' pneumoconiosis (here .. 
1 The House and Senate Reports on the 1969 Act placed the· 
number of afflicted active and retired miners at 100,000. S. Rep. 
No. 411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1969), and H. R. Rep. No. 563, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 17 (1969) . The Senate Report, supra, at 7, 
specified that, on the basis of X-ray examination, the disease rate 
was 10% for then-active coal miners, and 20% for inactive coaJ 
miners. Other estimates have run significantly higher. See, e. g., 
Hearings on S. 355, before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 
·2, at 641 (1969) . 
2 Coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a distinct clinical entity, and is: 
not the only type of pneumoconiosis. The remarks of the Surgeon 
General, reproduced in H. E,. Re9. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess .• 
74-1302 & 74-1316-OPINION 
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after "pneumoconiosis") is generally diagnosed on the 
basis of X-ray opacities indicating nodular lesions on the 
lungs of a patient with a long history of coal dust ex-
posure. As the Surgeon General has stated, however, 
post-mortem examination data have indicated a greater 
prevalence of the disease than X-ray diagnosis reveals. 
According to the Surgeon General, pneumoconiosis is 
customarily classified as "simple" or "complicated." 8 
Simple pneumoconiosis, ordinarily identified by x-ray 
opacities of a limited extent, is generally regarded by 
physicians as seldom productive of significant ventilatory 
impairment. Complicated pneumoconiosis, generally far 
more serious, involves progressive massive fibrosis as a 
complex reaction to dust and other factors ( which may 
include tuberculosis or other infection), and usually 4 
produces significant pulmonary impairment and marked 
respiratory disability. This disability limits the victim's 
physical capabilities, may induce death by cardiac failure, 
and may contribute to other causes of death.5 
Removing the miner from the source of coal dust has 
so far proved the only effective means of preventing 
the contraction of pneumoconiosis, and once contracted 
the disease is irreversible in both its simple and compli~ 
cated stages. No therapy has been developed. Finally, 
because the disease is progressive,° at least in its com~ 
at 15 (1969), indicate that the pathological condition of pneu-
moconiosis may also be caused by inhalation of other dusty materials, 
such as cotton fibers or silica. 
8 S. Rep. No. 411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 7-8 (1969) ; H. R. Rep. 
No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 15-16 (1969) . 
4 There was evidence before Congress that the complicated stage 
of the disease is sometimes exhibited with "mild pulmonary function 
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plicated stage, its SYillPtoms mdecome aw areB,!i only \\ 
after4 ~ left the.Jloal mi~es. - ~ -- 11 
In order to curb th'; incideiice of pneumoconiosis, Con-
gress provided in Title II of the Coal Mine Health and 
Safety Act of 1969, § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841 
et seq., for limits on the amount of dust to be permitted 
in the ambient air of coal mines. Additionally, in view 
of the then-established prevalence of irreversible pneu-
moconiosis among miners, and the insufficiency of state 
compensation programs, Congress passed Title IV of the 
1969 Act, § 401 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq:J_!.9.ZO -
ed.), to provide benefits to afflicted mineit_S and their 
survivors. These benefit provisions were subsequently 
broadened by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972. 30 
U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (Supp. IV). 
As amended, the Act divides the financial responsi-
bility for payment of benefits into three parts. Under 
P,.&£.LB of Title IV, §§ 411-414, 30 U. S. C. §§ 921-924 
(1970 ed. and Supp. IV), claims filed between Decem- \ 
her 30, 1969, the date of enactment, and June 30, 1973, 
are adjudicated by the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare and paid by the United States.7 
Under Part C of Title IV, §§ 421-431, 30 U. S. C. 
§§ 931-941 ~ O ed. and Supp. IV), claims filed aftel" 
December 31, 1973, are to be processed under an appli-
cable state workmen's compensation law approved by 
the Secretary of Labor under the standards set forth in 
§ 421, 30 U. S. C. § 931 (1970 ed. and Supp. IV) . In 
the absence of such an approved state program, and to, 
1 As of December 31, 1974, 556,200 claims had been filed under 
Part B of the law. As of that date, with all but 400 cases decided, 
509,900 individuals had established eligibility as black lung bene-
ficiaries under the Act. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, Fifth Annual Report to Congress on the Administration 
of Part B of Title IV of the l<'ecleral Coal Mine Health and Safety 
Act of 1969, at 3 (1975). 
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date 110 .. st,e_2ro&;am ,ha& been apprQ_ved, claims are 
to be filed with and adjudicated by the Secretary of 
Labor, and paid by ths, mine ogerators. § 422, 30 
U. S. C. § 932 (1970 ed. and ~upp. rtT). Under § 422 
an operator, who is entitled to a hearing in connection 
with these claims, is liable for :e__art _Q benefits with I 
respect to death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis 
arising out of employment in a mine for which the 
operator is responsible. The operator's liability for Part 
C benefits covers the period from January 1, 1974, to 
December 30, 1981. Payments of benefits up,der Part C 
are to the same categories of persons-a miner pr certain 
survivors--and in the same amounts, as under Part B. 
§§ 422 (c), (d); see§ 412 (a), 30 U.S. C. § 922 (a) (1970 
ed. and Supp. IV) .8 
Claims filed during the transition Reriod between Fed-
eral Government benefit provision under Part B, and 
state plan or operator benefit provision under Part C-
that is, July 1 to December. 31, 1973-are adjudicated 
under § 415 of Part B, 30 U. S. C. § 925 (Supp. IV), by 
the Secretary of Labor. The United States is responsible 
8 The individual claimant is entitled to benefits at a rate equal to 
50% of the minimum monthly payment to which a totally disabled 
federal employee in Grade GS-2 is entitled. § 412 (a) ( 1), 30 U. S. C. 
§ 922 (a) (1) . At current rates, the individual claimant's entitle-
ment is $196.80 per month, or $2,361.60 per year. 40 Fed. Reg, 
56886-56887 (Dec. 5, 1975) ; see 20 CFR §410.510 (1975) . These 
basic benefits are increased if the claimant has dependents; the 
maxunum increase of 100% is available if the claimant has 3 or 
more dependents. 30 U. S. C. § 922 (a) (4) (Supp. IV) . See also 
30 U. S. C. §922 (a)(3), (5) (Supp. IV) . Thus, the maximum in 
benefits to which a claimant could be entitled is $393.50 per month, 
or $4,722 per year. Benefits under Part C are reduced to account 
for certam alternative income. § 422 (g), 30 U. S. C. § 932 (g) . 
In addition to these monthly benefits, the operators are responsible 
for claimants' medical expenses. See § 422 (a), 30 U.S. C. § 932 (a) 
(Supp. IV) , incorporating 33 U. S. G. § 907 (Supp. IV). 
.. , 
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for payment on these claims until December 31, 1973. 
Responsible operators, having been notified of a claim 
and entitled to participate in a hearing thereon, are 
thereafter liable for benefits as if the claim had been 
filed pursuant to Part C and § 422 had been applicable 
to the operator. 
The Act provides that a miner shall be considered 
"totally disabled," and consequently entitled to compen-
sation, "when pneumoconiosis prevents him from engag-
ing in gainful employment requiring the skills and abili-
ties comparable to those of any employment in a mine 
or mines in whfoh he previously engaged with some regu-
larity and over a substantial period of time." § 402 (f), 
30 U. S. C. § 902 (f) (Supp. IV).0 The Act also pre-
scribes seve~ l "presumptions" for use in determmmg 
compensable disability.10 Under §411(c)(3), a miner 
shown by X-ray or other clinical evidence to be afflicted 
with complicated pneumoconiosis is "irrebuttably pre. 
9 Section 402 (f) provides in full: 
"The term 'total disability' has the meaning given it by regulations 
of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, except tha.t such 
regulations shall provide that a miner shall be considered totally 
disabled when pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful 
employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those 
of any employment in a mine or mines in which he previously en-
gaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time. 
Such regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria than 
those applicable under section 423 (d) of Title 42." · 30 U. S; C. 
§ 902 (f) (Supp. IV) . 
The Act defines "pneumoconiosis"· as "a chronic dust disease of 
the lung arising out of employment in a coal mine." § 402 (b) , 30 
U. S. C. § 902 (b) (Supp. IV) . 
10 These presumptions are applicable directly to Part B adjudica-
. tions by the Secretary of HEW, and indirectly to transition period 
and Part C adjudications by the Secretary of Labor by operation 
of §§ 422 (h) and 411 (b), 30 U. S. C. §§ 932 (h); 921 (b) (Supp. 
IV) . See also §§422 (f)(2); 430, 30 U.S. C. §§932 ·(f)(2) ; 94{)1 
(Supp. IV). 
' 
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sumed" to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis; 
if he has died, it is irrebuttably presumed that he was 
totally disabled by pneumoconiosis at the time of his 
death, and that his death was due to pneumoconiosis. 30 
U. S. C. § 921 (c)(3) (Supp. IV). In any event, the j 
presumption o era conclusivel to establish entitle- \ 
men ene ts. 
The other presumptions are each explicitly rebuttable 
by an operator seeking to avoid liability. There are three 
such presumptions. First, if a miner with 10 or more 
years' employment in the mines contracts pneumoconiosis, 
it is rebuttably presumed that the disease arose out of such 
employment. § 411 (c)(l), 30 U. S. C. § 921 (c) (1) 
(Supp. IV). Second, if a miner with 10 or more years' 
employment in the mines died from a respirab1e disease, 
it is rebuttably presumed that his death was due to 
pneumoconiosis. § 411 (c)(2), 30 U. S. C. § 921 (c)(2) 
(Supp. IV). Finally, if a miner, or the survivor of a 
miner, with 15 or more years' employment in under-
ground coal mines is able, despite the absence of clinical 
evidence of complicated pneumoconiosis, to demonstrate 
a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, 
the Act rebuttably presumes that the total disability is 
due to pneumoconiosis, that the miner was totally dis-
abled by pneumoconiosis when he died, and that the 
miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis. § 411 ( c )( 4), 
30 U. S. C. § 921 (c)(4) (Supp. IV).11 Section 411 (c) 
( 4) specifically provides that "[t]he Secretary may 
rebut [ this latter] presumption only by establishing that 
(A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconio-
sis, or that (B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment 
did not arise out of, or in connection with, employment 
11 The use of this presumption in Part C adjudications is limited. 
in some regards not significant in this case. See §§ 421 (f) (2) ; 430, 
30 U. S. C. §§ 931 (f)(2); 940 (Supp. IV). 
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in a coal mine." Moreover, under § 413 (b), 30 U. . C. 
§ 923 (b) (Supp. IV), none of these three rebuttable 
presumptions may be defeated solely on the basis of a 
chest X-ray.12 
II 
In initiating this suit against the defendant Secretaries 
(hereafter the "Federal Parties"), thf:t Operators con-
tended that the amended Act is unconstitutional insofar 
asj t requires t§,_payment of benefits with respect.,to 
miners who left em loyment in the indust before the 
e ec 1v a o Act; t at t e Act's definitions, pre-
sumptions, and limitations on rebuttal evidence uncon-
stitutionally impair the operator's ability to def end 
against benefit claims; and that certain regulations pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of Labor regarding the appor-
tionment of liability for benefits among operators, and 
the provision of medical benefits, are inconsistent with 
the Act and constitutionally defective. 
The three-judge District Court held that all issues as 
to the validity of the challenged regulations were within 
the jurisdiction of a single district judge, and the Court 
entered an order so remanding them. 385 F. Supp., at 
426. The District Cou~t upheld each challenged statu-
12 Section 413 (b) provides in pertinent part : " ... no claim for· 
benefits under this part shall be denied solely on the basis of the 
results of a chest roentgenogram." 30 U. S. C. § 923 (b) (Supp. 
IV) (emphasis added). Section 413 (b) is found in Part B of Title 
IV. Section 430, 30 U.S. C. § 940 (Supp. IV), provides, however, 
that "[t]he amendments made by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972' 
to part B . . . shall, to the extent appropriate, also a.pply [ with limita,. 
tions not relevant here] to .. . pa.rt [CJ." The legislative history, 
moreover, makes clear that the § 413 (b) limitation on use of X-ray 
evidence, enacted as § 4 (f) of the 1972 Act, was intended to apply 
to Part C claims as well as Part B claims, see H. R. Rep. No. 1048,. 
92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1972) , and the Operators so concede .. 
13riEif for Operators, at 2l... 
1' 
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tory provision as constitutional, with two exceptions. 
First, the District Court held that§ 411 (c) (3)'s irrebut~ 
table presumption is unconstitutional as an unreasonable 
and arbitrary legislative finding of total disability "in 
terms other than those provided by the Act as standards 
for total disability.'' 385 F. Supp., at 430. Second, read-
ing the limitation on evidence in rebuttal to § 411 (c) 
( 4) 's presumption of total disability due to pneumo-
coniosis to apply to an operator's defense in a § 415 
transition period case, the District Court found that 
limitation unconstitutional in two respects, It held 
the limitation arbitrary and unreasonable in not per-
mittmg a rebuttal showing that the case of pneumo-
coniosis afflicting the min.er was not disabling. 385 F . 
upp., at 430. And taking the provision to mean that 
an operator may defend against liability only on the 
ground that the pneumoconiosis did not arise out of em-
ployment in any coal mine, rather than on the ground 
that it did not arise out of employment in a coal mine 
for which the operator was responsible, the District Court 
found the provision an unreasonable and arbitrary 
limitation on rebuttal evidence relevant and proper under 
§ 422 (c), 30 U.S. C. § 932 (c) (1970 ed.). 385 F. Supp., 
at 430-431. The District Court accordingly entered an 
order declaring unconstitutional, and enjoining the Sec---
retary of Labor from seeking to apply, § 411 (c)(3)'s 
irrebuttable presumption and § 411 ( c) ( 4) 's limitation on 
rebuttable evidence~ 
The Operator's appeal, No. 74-1316, reasserts the con-
stitutional challenges rejected by the District Court. 
The appeal of the Federal Parties, No. 74-1302, seeks 
reversal of the declaration and injunction respecting the 
constitutionality of§§ 411 (c) (3) and (4). Neither side 
here questions the District Court's decision not to address 
the issues. rAl$ed with respect to the Secretary of Labor'$ 
; 
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regulations. As we have already noted, we uphold the 
~tatute against all the constitutional contentions properly 
presented here. Because we read the limitation on re-
buttal evidence in § 411 ( c )( 4) as inapplicable to the 
operators, however, we vacate that portion of the District 
Court's order which invalidates that limitation. 
III 
The Federal Parties direct our attention initially to 
National Independent Coal Operators Assn. v. Brennan, 
372 F . Supp. 16 (DC), summarily ajI'd, 419 U. S. 95-ij 
( 197 4), which raised a number of issues identical to those 
presented here. Our affirmance in that case did not fore .. 
close the District Coures determination of unconstitu-
tionality regarding § § 411 ( c) ( 3) and ( 4), those issues 
not having been before us on the appeal. Several ques-
tions presented here-most notably those of retroactivity 
and preclusion of sole reliance on X-ray testimony evi-
·dence--were raised and decided in National Independent 
'Coal Operators Assn. v. Brennan, but having heard oral 
argument and entertained full briefing on these issues 
together with the other questions raised in the case, we 
proceed to treat them here more fully. Cf. Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974) . 
IV 
The Operators contend that the amended Act violates 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by requiring 
them to c,2.mpensa! e former em:gloyees who terminated 
th; ir woE!_< m ""tTie 1iictustryb efore the Act was passed, 
ana ifie sl1l"vivors oi suc"fi employees.18 The Opera tots. 
13 For simplicity of discussion, we will generally refer to claims as 
though presented by the miner himself, although they may in fact 
be maintained upon death by a survivor. Neither the parties nor 
'the District Court have distinguished miners' claims from survivors;, 
'claims under tlrn const1tu.t1onal at.tacks raised in this casf}, 
. . 
.•·· 
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'acoept the liability imposed upon them to compensate 
'employees working in coal mines now and in the future 
who are disabled by pneumoconiosis; and they recognize 
'Congress' power to create a program for compensation 
of disabled inactive coal miners. But the Operators 
complain that to impose liability upon them for former 
employees' disabilities is impermissibl;y to £_harge them 
with an unexpected liabilit for ast, CQmpleted acts that 
w~ egally J2roper an~ _at least in ill!,rt, unknown to ·qe 
dangerous atfue time. -
--rt'is 6yrioww ell established that legislative. aets 
adjusting the burdens and bene'fits of economic life come 
to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, 
and that the burden is on one complaining of a ·due 
· process violation to establish that the legislature has 
acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. See, e.g., Fergu-
son v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee 
'Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 487-488 (1955). And this 
Court long a.go upheld against due process attack , the 
'competence of Congress to allocate the interlocking eco-
nomi7 rights and duties of employers a{id employees 
upon '~ rkmen's com_pensa,tion _principles' analogous , to 
· those enacted liere,- regardless of contravening arrange-
ments between employer and employee. · New Yark 
· Central R . Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (19-17); see also 
Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R . Co: v. Sch_u.,. 
· bert, 224 U. S. 603 (1912) . 
To be sure, insofar as the Act requires compensa-
tion for disabilities bred during ell}f'loyment terminated 
before the date \ of enactment, the Act has some retro-
~ although, as we have notiea, =the Act 
imposesnol bility on the operators until 1974.14 And 
a The Federal Parties suggest that since a claim for benefits 
under Part C must be filed within three years of the discovery of 
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~N ........ ~ - • - ~ it pn II y :,t, ,iat th e liabilitY imposed by the Act for ~~ 
disabilities suffered by former employees was not antioi- 0 \ ~ e---~ 
pated at the time of actual employment.15 But ourj ~ // 
cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and ~ ,.,1 t~ 
burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets other- . kj.', - (/ 
wise settled expectations. See Flemming v. Rhodes, -:#'V ~ ;,~ 
331 U. S. 100 (1947); Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co., 309 _.-it~~-
~U. S. 23 (1940); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., .... -~ · 
294 U. S. 240 (1935); Home Building & Loan Assn. v. L ~ ) ~ 
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Louisville & Nashville _ .Vft- J.ri. 
R . Co. v. Mottley, 219' U. S. 467 (1911). This is true \ ~ -
even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a ~ ~ 
new duty or liability based on past acts. See Lichter V. 
./ United States, 334 U. S. 742 (1948); Welch v. Henry, • 7 305 U. S. 134 (1938); Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co., ~ • 
290 u. s. 163 (1933). '\ 
It does not follow, howeveI\ that what Congress can I._ 
legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. 
Tp.e retrospective aspects of legislatiQP. · as well as the 
prospective aspects, must meet the test of due r ocess, 
and the justifications for tiie latter may not su ce for 
the former. Thus, in this case the justification for the 
retrospective imposition of liability must take into ac-
(f)(l), 30 U.S. C. §932 (f)(l) (Supp. IV), the operators will not 
ordinarily be liable for any disabilities maturing before enactment of 
their responsibility. See also § 422 (f) (2), 30 U.S. C. § 932 (f) (2) 
(Supp. IV). This does not hold true, however, for nonunderground 
operators, since Part C liability did not apply to them until 1972. 
See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, § 3, 86 Stat. 153, amending 
§§401; 402 (b), (d); 411 (c)(l), (2); 422 (a), (h); 423 (a), 30 
U. S. C. §§ 901; 902 (b), (d); 921(c) (1), (2); 932 (a), (h); 933 
,(a) (Supp. IV) . In any event, we think the point unnecessary to 
our conclusion. 
15 The Operators have not contended, however, that the Act is 
constitut1onally defective insofar as it requires them to provide 
compensation for present employees whose disabilities may stem 





74-1302 & 74-1316--OPINION 
USERY v. TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO. 13 
count the possibilities that the Operators may not have 
known of the danger of their employees' contracting 
pneumoconiosis, and that even if they did know of the 
danger their conduct may have been taken in reliance 
upon the curren,t state of The law, which imposed no 
.... ew.s 
liability on them for disabling pneumoconiosis.111 While 
the Operators have clearly been aware of the danger of 
pneumoconiosis for at least 20 years,1 7 and while they 
have not specifically pressed the contention that they 
would have taken steps to reduce or eliminate the inci-
dence of pneumoconiosis had the law imposed liability 
upon them, we would nevertheless hesitate to approve 
the retrospective imposition of liability on an~ theory o.f 
deterrenQe, cf. United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 542 
(1975), £> b eworthiness, cf. id.,· DeVeau v. Brai.sted, 
363 U.S. 144, 160 960 . 
We find, however~ that the ill2Position of liability for 
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified as 
a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees~ 
16 Whether or not a person who could have anticipated the po-
tential liability attaching to his chosen course of conduct would 
have avoided the liability by altering his conduct has been sig-
nificant in at least one line of cases in this Court. In Welch v. 
Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938), the Court upheld against a due process 
attack a state statute enacted in 1935 taxing 1933 dividend income 
that the 1933 taxing statute had explicitly exempted. Adopting the 
view that a stockholder would have continued to receive corporate 
dividends even if he knew that the dividends would subsequently 
be taxed, the Court distinguished prior cases invalidating the retro-
active taxation of gifts on the ground that the donor might have 
refrained from making the gift had he anticipated the tax. / d., 
at 147-148. But see Carpenter v. Wabash R . Co., 309 U. S. 23 
(1940) ; Louisville & Nashville R . Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 
(1911) . 
17 Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was recognized in Great Britain as 
early as 1943. It was not generally recognized m the Uruted States 
as an entity distinct from silicosis until the 1950's. S. Rep. No. 41'1., 
91st Cong., 1st Sess.,.at 8 (1969) . 
'· 
, .. . 
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disabilities to those who have profite from the fruits of 
thei.io labor-the '7>per:t'ors ana the coal consumerso The 
~ ... 
Operators do not challenge Congress' power to impose 
the burden of past mine working conditions on the indus-
try" They do claim, however, that the Act spreads costs 
in an arbitrary and irrational manner by basing liability 
upon past employment relationships, rather than taxing 
all coal mine operators presently in business. The Oper-
ators note that a coal mine operator whose work force 
has declined may be faced with a total liability that is 
disproportionate to the number of miners currently em-
ployed. And they argue that the liability scheme gives 
an @ fa!r.2,_ompetitive advant~ e to new entrants into the 
industry, who are not saddi ed with the burden of com-
pensation for inactive miners' disabilities. In, essence the 
Operators contend that competitive forces will prevent 
them from effectively passing on to the consumer the 
costs of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities, 
and will unfairly leave the burden on the early operators 
alone" 
Of course, as we have already indicated, a substantial 
portion of the burden for disabilities stemming from the 
period prior to enactment is born by the Federal Govern--
ment. But even taking the Operators' argument at face 
value, it is for Congress to choose between imposing the 
burden of inactive miners' disabilities on all operators,, 
including new entrants and farsighted early operators who, 
might have taken steps to minimize black lung dangers, 
I 
or to impose that liability solely on those early operators· 
whose profits may have been increased at the expense oi 
their employees' health" We are unwilling to assess the 
wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme by examining the 
0degree to which the "cost-savings" enjoyed by op'erators 
in the pre-enactment period produced "~~ ' 
or the degree to which the retrospective lia ility imposed: 
I 
' J> . 
~Jr 
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on the e y operators can now be passed on to the con-
sumer. It is enough to say 1t.at the Act approaches the I 
problem of_ cost-spreading rationally; whether a broader 
cost-spreading scheme would have_ been wiser or more 
practical under the circumstances is not a question of 
constitutional dimension. See, e. g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 
372 U.S. 726, 730-732 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical 
Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955). 
The Onerators ultimately rest their due process ar u-
ment on Railroa etirement oar v. on . o., 295 
U. S. 330 0935) , in ~ ich the 'court found the Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1934 to be unconstitutional. -Among 
the provisions specifically invalidated as arbitrary was a 
provision for employer-financed pensions for former em-
ployees who, though not in the employ of the railroads 
-at the time of enactment, had been so employed within 
the year,. Assuming that the portion of Alton invalidat- ( 
ing this provision retains vitality,18 we find it distingui~ -
a.bk from this case. The point of the black lung benefit 
provisions is not simply to increase or supplement a 
former employee's salary to meet his generalized need 
for funds. Rather, the pua2ose of the Act is to satisfy a \ 
specific need created by the d angerous conditions under 
which the former employee labored-to allocate to Jl!,e. 
mine o rator an actual measurable cos't of his business. 
n sum, e Due rocess ause poses no ar to re-
quiring an operator to provide compensation for a 
former employee's death or disability due to pneumo-
coniosis arising out of employment in its mines, even 
if the former employee terminated his employment in 
the industry before the Act was passed. 
18 Chief Justice Hughes, joined by· Justices Brandeis, Stone and 
Cardozo, dissented from the Court's invalidating the Railroad Re-
tirement Act altogether, but agreed with the Court that the pro- lA 
vision for allowances to former employees was arbitrary. 295 U. S., f \ 
at 3'14, 389. 
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V 
We turn next to a consideration of the Operators' chal-
lenge to the "presumptions" and evidentiary rules gov• 
erning adjudications of compensable disability under the 
Act. 
A 
The Act prescribes two alternate methods for show-
ing "total disability," which is a prerequisite to com-
pensation. First, a miner is "totally disabled" under the 
definition contained in§ 402 (f), if pneumoconiosis, simple 
or complicated, 
"prevents him from engaging in gainful employ-
ment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to 
those of any employment in a mine or mines in 
which he previously engaged with some regularity 
and over a substantial period of time." 19 
Second, if a miner can show by clinical evidence ( ordi-
narily X-ray evidence) that he is afflicted with compli-
·cated pneumoconiosis, the incurable and final stage of the 
disease, then the miner is deemed to be totally disabled 
under§ 411 (c) (3) .20 Thus, Congress has mandated that 
·rn For the full text of § 402 (f) see n. 9, supra. 
20 Section 411 (c) (3) provides : 
"[I] f a miner is suffering or suffered from a chronic dust disease of 
-the lung which (A) when diagnosed by chest roentgenogram, yieldS' 
, one or more large opacities (greater than one centimeter in diameter) 
and would be classified in category A, B, or C in the International 
•Classification of Radiographs of the Pneumoconioses by the In-
ternational Labor Organization, (B) when diagnosed by biopsy or 
autopsy, yields massive lesions in the lung, or (C) when diagnosis is 
made by other means, would be a condition which could reasonably 
be expected to yield results described in clause (A) or (B) , then there 
· shall be an irrebuttable presumption that he is totally disabled due 
to pneumoconiosis or that his death was due to pneumoconiosis or 
that .at the time of his • death he was totally disabled by pneu• 
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the final stage of the disease is always compensable if 
its existence can be shown by positive clinical evidence, 
and that any stage of the disease is compensable when 
physically disabling under the terms of § 402 (f). The 
Operators maintain that both of these standards are 
constitutionally untenable. 
(1) 
The Operators contend that the definition of total 
disability set up in § 402 (f) is unconstitutionally arbi-
trary and irrational, because it provides for the com-
pensation of former miners who might well be employ-
able in other lines of work, and who therefore are not 
truly disabled by their mining-generated afflictions. ·we 
think it patent that this attack on § 402 (f) must fail. 
A miner disabled under § 402 ( f) standards has suffered 
in at least two ways: his health is impaired, and he 
has been rendered unable to perform the kind of work 
to which he has adapted himself. Whether these inter-
ferences medt compensation is a public policy matter 
left primarily to the determination of the legislature. 
Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S, 484 (1974). We can,.. 
not say that they are so insignificant as not to be a 
rational basis for compensation. Indeed, we long ago up~ 
held against similar attack a workmen's compensation 
scheme providing benefits for injuries not depriving the 
employee of his ability to work. See New York Central" 
R , Co. v. Bianc, 250 U. S. 596 (1919); cf. Urie v. Thomp-
on, 337 U. S. 163, 181-187 (1949). 
( ) 
The District Court, relying on such cases as Stanley ·v •. 
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), and Vlandis v. Kline, 412' 
moconiosis, as the ca,se may he." ao U. S. C. § 921 (c) (3) (SupQ.. 
H), 
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U. 441 (1973), invalidated § 411 ( c)(3) 's "irrebutJ 
table presumption" of total disability due to pneumo-
comosis based on clinical evidence of complicated pneu .. 
mocomos1s. The presumption, the Court explained, 
«'forecloses all fact finding as to the effect of that 
disease upon a particular coal miner . . . . To the 
extent that such presumption purports to making 
a finding of total disability in terms other than those 
provided by [ § 402 (f) ] as standards for total dis-
ability, it is unreasonable and arbitrary. As written, 
section [ 411 ( c )(3)] is violative of due process in 
precluding the opportunity to present evidence as 
to the effect of a chronic dust disease upon an in-
dividual in determining whether or not he is 
disabled." 385 F. Supp., at 429-430. 
We think the District Court erred in equating this case 
with those in the mold of Stanley and Vlandis. Sec-
tion 411 (c) (3) does not suffer from the flaw that has 
been present in our cases invalidating statutes as creat-
ing conclusive presumptions of fact. 
As an operational matter, the effect of § 411 (c) (3)'s• 
"irrebuttable presumption" of total disability is simply 
to establish entitlement in the case of a miner who is 
clinically diagnosable as extremely ill with pneumoconi-
osis arising out of coal mine employment.21 Indeed, the 
21 Although the premise of §411 (c)(3), that the miner have a 
"-chrome dust disease of the lung," does not explicitly provide that 
the disease must be one arising out of employment in a coal mine, 
it is clear under§ 422 (a), and hence under§ 415 (a) (5) as well, that 
an operator can be liable only for pneumoconiosis arismg out of 
employment in a coal mine. Section 422 (a) provides that Part C' 
11ab1lity "shall be applicable to each operator of a coal mme ... 
with respect to death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis aris~ 
mg out of employment m such mine." 30 U. S C. § 032 (a• 
(Supp fV ). 
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disabilities to those who have profite from the fruits of 
their labor-th:' oper~ ors and the coal consumers. The -= :w 
Operators do not challenge Congress' power to impose 
the burden of past mine working conditions on the indus-
try. They do claim, however, that the Act spreads costs 
in an arbitrary and irrational manner by basing liability 
upon past employment relationships, rather than taxing 
all coal mine operators presently in business. The Oper-
ators note that a coal mine operator whose work force 
has declined may be faoed with a total liability that is 
disproportionate to the number of miners currently em-
ployed. And they argue that the liability scheme gives 
an @ falt,sompetitive advant~ e to new entrants into the 
industry, who are not saddi ed with the burden of com-
pensation for inactive miners' disabilities. In essence the 
Operators contend that competitive forces will prevent 
them from effectively passing on to the consumer the 
costs of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities, 
and will unfairly leave the burden on the early operators 
alone. 
Of course, as we have already indicated, a substantiai 
portion of the burden for disabilities stemming from the 
period prior to enactment is born by the Federal Govern-
ment. But even taking the Operators' argument at face 
value, it is for Congress to choose between imposing the 
burden of inactive miners' disabilities on all operators,, 
including new entrants and farsighted early operators who, 
might have taken steps to minimize black lung dangers, 
I 
or to impose that liability solely on those early operators· 
whose profits may have been increased at the expense ot 
their employees' health . We are unwilling to assess the 
wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme by examinhig the 
·degree to which the "cost-savings" enjoyed by op'erators 
in the pre-enactment period produced "~t'c~~' 
or the degree to which the retrospective lia ility imposed: 
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U. 441 (1973), invalidated § 411 ( c)(3) 's "irrebutJ 
table presumption" of total disability due to pneumo-
<;omosis based on clinical evidence of complicated pneu .. 
mocomos1s. The presumption, the Court explained, 
uf orecloses all fact finding as to the effect of that 
disease upon a particular coal miner . . . . To the 
extent that such presumption purports to making 
a finding of total disability in terms other than those 
provided by [ § 402 ( f) ] as standards for total dis• 
ability, it is unreasonable and arbitrary. As written, 
section [ 411 ( c )(3)] is violative of due process in 
precluding the opportunity to present evidence as 
to the effect of a chronic dust disease upon an in-
dividual m determining whether or not he is 
disabled." 385 F. Supp., at 429-430. 
We think the District Court erred in equa.ting this case 
with those in the mold of Stanley and Vlandis. Sec-
tion 411 (c) (3) does not suffer from the flaw that has 
been present in our cases invalidating statutes as creat-
ing conclusive presumptions of fact. 
As an operational matter, the effect of § 411 (c) (3)'8· 
"irrebuttable presumption" of total disability is simply 
to establish entitlement in the case of a miner who is 
clinically diagnosable as extremely ill with pneumoconi-
osis arising out of coal mine employment.21 Indeed, the-
21 Although the premise of §411 (c)(3), that the miner have a 
"chronic dust disease of the lung," does not explicitly provide that 
the disease must be one arising out of employment in a coal mine, 
it is clear under§ 422 (a), and hence under§ 415 (a) (5) as well, that 
an operator can be liable only for pneumoconiosis arising out of 
employment in a coal mine. Section 422 (a) provides that Part C' 
liability "shall be applicable to each operator of a coal mme .. , 
with respect to death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis aris-
mg out of rmployment in such mine." 30 U. S C. § 932 (a~ 
(Supp IV). 
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legislative history discloses that it was precisely this ad~ 
vanced and progressive stage of the disease that Congress 
sought most certainly to compensate.22 Were the Act 
phrased simply and directly to provide that operators 
were bound to provide benefits for all miners clinically 
demonstrating their affliction with complicated pneu-
moconiosis arising out of employment in the mines, we 
think it clear that there could be no due process objection 
to it. For, as we have already observed, destruction of 
earning capacity is not the sole legitimate basis for com-
pulsory compensation of employees by their employers. 
New York Central R. Co. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919). 
We cannot say that it would be irrational for Congress to 
conclude that impairment of health alone warrants com-
pensation. Since Congress can clearly draft a statute to 
accomplish precisely what it has accomplished through 
§ 411 (c) (3)'s presumption of disability, the argument 
is essentially that Congress has accomplished its result 
in an impermissible manner-by defining eligibility in 
terms of "total disability" and erecting an "irrebuttable 
presumption" of total disability upon a factual showing 
that does not necessarily satisfy the statutory definition 
of total disability. But in a statute such as this, regulat-
22 The original House and Senate Bills that gave rise to the Con-
ference Bill enacted as Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health 
and Safety Act of 1969 each provided for compensation only for 
complicated pneumoconiosis. H. R. 13950, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
'§§ 112 (b)(l), (7)(B), as it passed the House, 115 Cong, Rec. 32061 
(Oct. 29, 1969), contained the diagnostic criteria presently embodied 
in § 411 ( c) (3) , and deemed complicated pneumocortiosos to be 
"totally disabling" and compensable. S. 2911, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
§§ 501-504, as amended on the floor, 115 Cong. Rec. 27632 
(Sept 30, 1969), and passed, 115 Cong. Rec. 28243 (Oct. 2, 
1969) , established a program of interim benefits for total disability 
due to complicated pneumoconiosis, and directed the Secretary , of 
Health, Education, and Welfare to develop standards for deter--
•inining total disability due to complicated pneumoconiosis. 
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ing purely economic matters, we do not think that Con., 
gress' choice of statutory language can invalidate the 
enactment when its operation and effect are clearly pere 
missible. Cf. McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U. S. 
802, 809 (1969); United States v. Carolene Products Co,, 
304 u. s. 144, 154 (1938). 
This focus on the operative effect of the legislation, 
rather than its particular phrasing, is consistent with our 
modem cases employing "irrebutable presumption" ter-
minology. E. g., Cleveland Board of Education v. 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In 
none of these cases did the statute in question explicitly 
create an irrebuttable presumption. The Court's focus in 
each case was on the operation of the statute, not its phras-
ing, and no functionally identical reupholstering of the 
statute would have saved it.28 In each case the fatal flaw 
was not simply that the statute in effect created an irre-
buttable presumption, but that the criteria that gave 
rise to the so-called irrebuttable presumption did not 
pass muster under the appropriate standard of review. 
Since the criteria giving rise to § 411 (c)(3)'s presum~ 
tion of total disability provide a permissible basis for 
compensation under the standard of rationality appli-
cable to this legislation, we cannot say that it is uncon .. 
stitut10nal merely on account of the form of words. 
28 Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926), also relied upon 
by the Operators, is no different in substance. The enactment in. 
validated in that case, levying an estate tax upon gifts made within 
six years of death, was statutorily framed as a conclusive presump-
tion that such gifts were made in contemplat10n of death and there,. 
fore taxable. But the decision did not rest solely upon the statutory 
framing. Rather, the Court made clear that, however drawn, the· 
tatute could not, consistent with prevailing views of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, have applied the tax to gifts solely on the ground that 
they were made within six years of death. See also Heiner v. Don-
.rian, 285 U. S 312, 329 (1932). 
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(3) 
In addition to creating an irrebuttable presumption 
of total disability, § 411 ( c) ( 3) provides that clinical evi-
dence of a miner's complicated pneumoconiosis gives rise 
to an irrebuttable presumption that he was totally dis-
abled by pneumoconiosis at the time of his death, and that 
his death was due to pneumoconiosis. The effect of these 
p11esumptions, in particular the presumption of death due 
to pneumoconiosis, is to grant benefits to the survivors 
of any miner who during his lifetime had complicated 
pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in the mines, 
regardless of whether the miner's death was caused by 
pneumoconiosis. The Operators raise no separate chal-
lenge to these presumptions, and we would have no 
occasion to comment separately on them were it not for 
the Operators' general complaint against the application 
of the Act to employees who terminated their employ-
ment before the Act was passed. To the extent that the 
presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis is viewed 
as requiring compensation for damages resulting from 
death unrelated to the operator's conduct, its application 
to employees who terminated their employment before 
the Act was passed would present difficulties not en-
countered in our prior discussion of retroactivity. The 
justification we found for the retrospective application of 
the Act 1s that it serves to spread costs in a rational man-
ner- by allocating to the operator an actual cost of his 
business, the avoidance of which might be thought to 
have enlarged the operator's profits. The dama.ge result-
ing from a miner's death that is due to causes other than 
the operator's conduct can hardly be termed a "cost'' of 
the operator's business,. 
We think it clear, however, that the benefits author-
ized by § 411 (c) (3)'s presumption of death due to pneu-
moconiosis were intended not simply as compensation for 
d amages due to the miner's death1 but as deferred com--
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pensation for injury suffered during the miner's lifetime 
as a result of his illness itself. Thus, the Senate Report 
accompanying the 1972 amendments makes clear Con-
gress' purpose to award benefits not only to widows 
whose husbands "[gave] their lives," but also to widows 
whose husbands "gave their health ... in the service of 
the nation's critical coal needs." 24 
In the case of a miner who died with, but not from, 
pneumoconiosis before the Act was passed, the benefits 
serve as deferred compensation for the suffering endured 
by his dependents by virtue of his illness. And in the 
case of a miner who died with, but not from, pneumo-
coniosis after the Act was passed, the benefits serve an 
additional purpose: the miner's knowledge that his de-
pendent survivors would receive benefits serves to com-
pensate him for the suffering he endures. In short, § 411 
(c)(3) 's presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis 
authorizes compensation for injury attributable to the 
operator's business, and viewed as such it poses no retro-
activity problems distinct from those considered in our 
prior discussion. 
It might be suggested that the payment of benefits to 
dependent survivors is irrational as a scheme of compen-
sation for injury suffered as a result of a miner's dis-
ability. But we cannot say that the scheme is wholly 
unreasonable in providing benefits for those who were 
most likely to have shared the miner's suffering. Nor 
can we say that the scheme is arbitrary simply because 
it spreads the payment of benefits over a period of time.2s-
~, S. Rep. No. 743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (19,72) 
25 Under the present scheme, the payment of monthly benefits is 
not without limit. Section 422 (e) quite clearly provides that "[n]o 
payment of benefits shall be required under this section ... (2) for 
any period prior to January 1, 1974; or (3) for any period after 
twelve years after December 30, 1969." 30 U. S. C. § 932 (e) (Supp. 
IV) . This t ime limitation , applicable in Part C cases by its terms, 
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W,e might face a more difficult problem in applying 
§ 411 (c)(3)'s presumption of death due to pneumo-
coniosis on a retrospective basis if the presumption au-
thorized benefits to the survivors of a miner who did 
not die from pneumoconiosis, and who during his life was 
completely unaware of and unaffected by his illness; or, 
in the case of a miner who died before the Act was 
passed, if the presumption authorized benefits to the 
survivors of a miner who did not die from pneumoconio-
sis, who nevertheless was aware of and affected by his 
illness, but whose dependents were completely unaware 
of and unaffected by his illness. But the Operators in 
their facial attack on the Act have not suggested that a 
miner whose condition was serious enough to activate 
the § 411 (c)(3) presumptions might not have been af-
fected in any way by his condition, or that the family 
of such a miner might not have noticed it. Under the 
circumstances, we decline to engage in speculation as to 
whether such cases may arise.26 
B 
Turning our attention to the statutory regulations of 
proof of § 402 (f) disability, we focus initially on the 
is also applicable to transition period cases by virtue of§ 415 (a)(5), 
'30 U S. C. § 925 (a) (5) (Supp. IV). Thus, the operator JS liable 
for monthly payments only for a period of eight years. The total 
amount payable to a single dependent survivor during this period, 
under current rates, is approximately $18,900. The maximum 
amount for which the operator would be liable, if the mmer ha4 
four or more dependent survivors, is approximately $37,800. See, 
n. 8, supra. 
:211 Our analysis •of the retrospective application of the § 411 ( c) (3) 
-presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis is, of course, fully 
applicable to the retrospective application of any other provisions 
that might be construed to authorize benefits in the case of miners· 
who die with, but not from, totally disablmg pneumoconios1s. See· 
§§ 422 (a), (c) ; 412 (a), (2), (3), (5) ; 411 (a), 30 U. S. C. §§ 932' 
,(a,L (r) 922 (a.),(2),, (3) , (5) : ·92.1 (a,); (\1970 ed. and Supp TV)~ 
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Operators' challenge to the presumptions contained in 
§§ 411 (c)(l) and (2). Section 411 (c)(l) provides that 
a coal miner with 10 years' employment in the mines 
who suffers from pneumoconiosis will be presumed to 
have contracted the disease from his employment.21 
· ection 411 (c)(2) provides that if a coal miner with 
10 years' employment in the mines dies from a respi-
rable disease, his death will be presumed to have been 
due to pneumocomosis.28 Each presumption is explicitly 
rebuttable, and the effect of each is simply to shift the 
burden of going forward with evidence from the claimant 
to the operator, See Fed. Rule Evid. 301, 
We have consistently tested presumptions arising in 
civil statutes such as this, involving matters of economic 
regulation, against the standard articulated in Mobile, 
Jackson and Kansas City R . Co. v. Turnipseed: 
«'That a legislative presumption of one fact from 
evidence of another may not constitute a denial of 
due process of law or a denial of the equal protection 
of the law it is only essential that there shall be 
ome rational connection between the fact proved 
·and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the infer-
ence of one fact from proof of another shall not be 
o unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary man-
date," 219 U, S, 35, 43 (1910), 
27 Sect,1on 411 (c)(l) , as amended, provides in full : 
" [I] f a mmer who 1s suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was 
employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there 
shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out 
of such employment." 30 U S. C. § 921 (c) (1) (Supp. IV). 
28 Sect,1on 411 (c) (2), as amended, provides in full : 
. ., [I] f a deceased miner was employed for ten years or more in one 
or more coal mines and died from a respirable disease there shall be· 
a rebuttable presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis/ "' 
\lO U. , C. § 921 (c)('2) (S11p_p. IV) . 
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See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U. S. 502 
(1933); Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 
U. S. 8, 19 (1931) . See also Leary v. United States, 395 
U. S. 6, 29-53 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 
463, 467-468 (1943) . Moreover, as we have recognized : 
"The process of making the determination of ration-
ality is, by its nature, highly empirical, and in 
matters not within specialized judicial competence 
or completely commonplace, significant weight 
should be accorded the capacity of Congress to 
amass the stuff of actual experience and cull con-
clusions from it." United States v. Gainey, 380 
u. s. 63, 67 (1965) . 
Judged by these standards, the presumptions contained 
in §§ 411 (c)(l) and (2) are constitutionally valid. The 
Operators focus their attack on the rationality of the 
presumptions' bases in duration of employment. But it 
is agreed hem that pneumoconiosis is caused by breath-
ing coal dust, and that the likelihood of a miner's 
developing the disease rests upon both the concentration 
of dust to which he was exposed and the duration of his 
exposure. Against this scientific background, it was not 
beyond Congress' authority to refer to exposure factors 
in establishing a presumption that throws the burden of 
going forward on the operators. And in view of the 
medical evidence before Congress indicating the notice-
able incidence of pneumoconiosis in cases of miners with 
10 years' employment in the mines,2° we cannot say that 
it was "purely arbitrary" for Congress to select the 10-
year figure as a point of reference for these presumptions. 
No greater mathematical precision is required. Cf. 
29 See, e g., Hearings on S. 355, before the Subcommittee OJl 
Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st 
Cong., 1st, Sess., Part 2, p. 699 (Testimony of Dr. Werner A. 
Laqueur). 
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Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. . 61, 78 
(1911) . 
The Operators insist, however, that the 10-year pre-
sumptions are arbitrary, because they fail to account for 
varying degrees of exposure, some of which would pose 
lesser dangers than others. We reject this contention. 
In providing for a shifting of the burden of going for-
ward to the operators, Congress was no more constrained 
to require a preliminary showing of the degree of dust 
concentration to which a miner was exposed, an historical 
fact difficult for the miner to prove, than it was to 
require a preliminary showing with respect to all other 
factors that might bear on the danger of infection. It 
is worth repeating that mine employment for 10 years 
does not serve by itself to activate any presumption of 
pneumoconiosis; it simply serves along with proof of 
pneumoconiosis under § 411 ( c) ( 1) to presumptively 
establish a cause of pneumoconiosis, and along with 
proof of death from a respirable disease under § 411 
(c) (2) to presumptively establish that death was due to 
pneumoconiosis. In its "rough accommodations," Me-
tropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69 
(1913), Congress was surely entitled to select duration 
of employment, to the exclusion of the degree of dust 
exposure and other relevant factors, as signalling the 
point at which the operator must come forward with 
evidence of the cause of pneumoconiosis or death, as the 
case may be. We certainly cannot say that the pre-
sumptions, by excluding other relevant factors, operate 
in a "purely arbitrary" manner. Mobile, Jackson and 
Kansas City R . Co. v Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 43 
{1910) 
The Operators press the same due process attack upon 
the durational basis of the rebuttable presumption in 
·§ 411 ( c )( 4) , which provides, inter alia, that a miner em--
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ployed for 15 years m underground mines, who is able to 
marshal evidence demonstrating a totally disabling respi-
ratory or pulmonary impairment, shall be rebuttably pre-
sumed to be totally disabled by pneumoconiosis.30 Par-
ticularly in light of the Surgeon General's testimony at 
the Senate Hearings on the 1969 Act to the effect that 
the 15-year point marks the beginning of linear increase 
in the prevalence of the disease with years spent under-
ground, 81 we think it clear that the durational basis of 
this presumption is equally unassailable. 
C 
The Operators also challenge § 413 (b) of the Act, 
which provides that "no claim for benefits ... shall be 
30 Section 411 ( c) ( 4) , as amended, provides in full : 
"[I] f a miner was employed for fifteen years or more in one or 
more underground coal mines, and if there is a chest roentgenogram 
submitted in connection with such miner's, his widow's, his child's, 
his parent's, his brother's, his sister's, or his dependent's claim under 
this subchapter and 1t is interpreted as negative with respect to the 
requirements of paragraph (3) of this subsection, and if other 
evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory 
or pulmonary impairment, then there shall be a rebuttable presump--
tion that such miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, that 
his death was due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his 
death he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. In the case of a 
living miner, a wife's affidavit may not be used by itself to establish 
the presumption. The Secretary shall not apply all or a portion 
of the requirement of this paragraph that the miner work in an 
underground mine where he determines that conditions of a miner's 
employment in a coal mme other than an underground mine were 
substantially similar to conditions in an underground mine. The-
Secretary may rebut such presumption only by establishing that 
(A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumocoruosis, or that 
(B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of,. 
or in connection with, employment in a coal mine." 30 U. S. C~ 
§ 921(c) (4) (Supp. IV) . 
u See S Rev, No 143, 92d. Cong., 2d Sess., at 13 (1972). 
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denied solely on the basis of a chest roentgenogram 
[X-ray]." z2 Congress, of course, has plenary authority 
over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal 
courts. See, e. g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U. . 
74, 78 (1958); Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467 
(1943); cf. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 
U. S. 61, 81 (1911).. The Operators contend, however, 
that § 413 (b) denies them due process because X-ray 
evidence is frequently the sole evidence they can mar-
shall to rebut a claim of pneumoconiosis.33 We conclude 
that, given Congress' reasoned reservations regarding the 
reliability of negative X-ray evidence, it was entitled to 
preclude exclusive reliance on such evidence. 
Congress was presented with significant evidence 
demonstrating that X-ray testing that fails to disclose 
pneumoconiosis cannot be depended upon as a trus~ 
worthy indicator of the absence of the disease.34 In par-
ticular, the findings of the Surgeon General and others 
indicated that although X-ray evidence was generally the 
rp.ost important diagnostic tool in identifying the pres--
ence or absence of pneumoconiosis, when considered alone 
it was not a wholly reliable indicator of the absence of 
the disease ; that autopsy frequently disclosed pneumo-
z~ See n. 12, supra 
33 The Operators frame · their argument by saying that the effect 
qf § 413 (b) is to render the rebuttable presumptions of § 411 (c) 
effectively irrebuttable. But this dressing adds nothing. Once it 
is determined that the limitation on X-ray evidence 1s perm1SSible· 
generally, it is irrelevant that the burden of going forward with 
some rebuttal evidence IS thrown upon the operator by a permis-
sible presumpt10n rather than by the claimant's affirmative factuaf 
.showmg , 
34 Our attention has not been directed to any authoritative ind1ca.,. 
tions that X-ray evidence of the presence of pneumocomosi.~ is: 
~trustworthy. 
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coniosis where X-ray evidence had disclosed none; 85 and 
that pneumoconiosis may be masked from X-ray detec-
tion by other disease.86 
Taking these indications of the unreliability of neg~ 
tive X-ray diagnosis at face value, Congress was faced 
with the problem of determining which side should bear 
the burden of the unreliability. On the one hand, pre-
clusion of any reliance on negative X-ray evidence would 
risk the success of some nonmeritorious claims; on the 
other hand, reliance on uncorroborated negative X-ray 
evidence would risk the denial of benefits in a significant 
number of meritorious cases. Congress addressed the 
problem by adopting a rule which, while preserving some 
of the utility, avoided the worst dangers of X-ray evi-
dence. Section 413 (b) does not make negative X-ray 
evidence inadmissible, or ineligible to be considered as 
ultimately persuasive evidence when taken together with 
other factors-for example, a low level of coal dust con~ 
centration in the Operator's mine, a relatively short dura-
tion of exposure to coal dust, or the likelihood that the 
miner is disabled by some other cause.37 The prohibition 
3 5 Evidence was produced at the Senate hearings showing that in 
one study 
"approximately 25 percent of a random sample of some 200 coal miners 
whose medical records based upon X-ray findings showed no coal-
worker's pneumoconiosis were found on post-mortem examination 
to have the disease." S. Rep. No, 743, 9,2d Cong., 2d Sess,, at 12 
(1972) . . 
86 Id., at 9--16 ; H. R Rep. No. 460, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 8-10 
(1971 ). 
37 Section 413 (b) directs additionally that 
"In determining the validity of claims under this part, all relevant 
evidence shall be considered, including, where relevant, medical tests 
such as blood gas studies, X-ray examination, electrocardiogram, 
pulmonary function studies, or physical performance tests, and any 
medical history, evidence submitted ·by the claimant's physician, or · 
'his wife's affi~Nit.s, and in t he case of a deceased miner, oth~,-
' 
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is only against sole reliance upon negative X-ray evidence 
in rejecting a claim. 
The Operators attack the limitation on the use of neg• 
ative X-ray evidence by suggesting that Congress' con-
clusion as to the unreliability of negative X-ray evidence 
is constitutionally unsupportable. Relying on other evi-
dence submitted to Congress in 1972,38 the Operators con-
tend that the consensus of medical judgment on the 
question is that good quality X-ray evidence does reliably 
indicate the presence or absence of pneumoconiosis. In 
essence, the Operators seek a judicial reconsideration of 
the judgment of Congress on this issue. But the relia-
bility of negative X-ray evidence was debated forcefully 
on both sides before the Congress, and the Operators 
here suggest nothing new to add to the debate; they are 
simply dissatisfied with Congress' conclusion. As we 
have recognized in the past, however, when it comes to 
evidentiary rules in matters "not within specialized ju-
dicial competence or completely commonplace," it is 
primarily for Congress "to amass the stuff of actual ex-
perience and cull conclusions from it." United States v. 
Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 67 (1965) . It is sufficient that 
the evidence before Congress showed doubts about the 
reliability of negative X-ray evidence. That Congress 
ultimately determined "to resolve doubts in favor of the 
disabled miner" 39 does not render the enactment arbi-
appropriate affidavits of persons with knowledge of the miner's 
physical condition, and other supportive materials." 30 U. S. C 
§ 923 (b) (Supp. IV) 
38 ThIS evidence was brought to the Heanngs by the Somal Secu-
rity Admmistration, whose rules the § 413 (b) limitation was 
,designed to overrule, and was credited by the minority of the House-
Committee on Educat10n and Labor . H . R Rep. No. 460, 92d Cong.~ 
]st Sess., at 22, 29-30 (1971) . 
39 S. Rep No . 74~, 92d Cong, 2d Sess., at 11 (1972). 
., 
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trary under the standard of rationality appropriate to 
this legislation . 
D 
Finally, the Operators challenge the limitation on re-
buttal evidence contained in§ 411 (c)(4) . That section, 
as we have indicated, provides that a miner employed 
for 15 years in underground mines who is able to demon-
strate a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary im-
pairment shall be rebuttably presumed to be totally 
disabled by pneumoconiosis, and his death shall be rebut-
tably presumed to be due to pneumoconiosis. The final 
sentence of § 411 ( c) ( 4) provides that 
"[t]he Secretary may rebut [the presumption pro-
vided herein] only by establishing that (A) such 
miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or 
that (B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment 
did not arise out of, or in connection with, employ~ 
ment in a coal mine." 
The effect of this limitation on rebuttal evidence is, 
inter alw, to grant benefits to any miner with 15 yea.rsf" 
employment in the mines, if he is totally disabled by 
some respiratory or pulmonary impairment arising in 
connection with his employment, and has a case of pneu-
moconiosis. The Operators contend that this limitation 
erects an impermissible irrebuttable presumption, because 
it establishes liability even though it might be medically 
demonstrable in an individual case that the miner's 
pneumoconiosis was mild and did not cause the dis-
ability- that the disability was wholly a product of other 
disease, such as tuberculosis or emphysema. Disability 
due to these diseases, as the Operators note, is not other-
wise compensable under the Act. 
The District Court, concluding that the quoted limita~ 
ti.an on rebut.ia.1 evidence applied against an operator iIJ 
. 
' 
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a § 415 transition period case, and recognizing that pneu-
moconiosis is not inherently disabling in the § 402 (f) 
sense, judged this limitation unconstitutional on the 
ground that it deprived an operator of a factual de-
fense--that the miner is not "totally disabled" due to 
pneumoconiosis under § 402 (f). Additionally, reading 
the second part of the § 411 ( c )( 4) limitation on rebuttal 
to preclude an operator's defense that the disease did not 
arise out of employment in the particular mines for 
which it was responsible, the District Court found this 
aspect of § 411 (c)( 4) unconstitutional as well. 
The Federal Parties urge on their cross-appeal that 
these constitutional judgments are erroneous. We need 
not inquire into the constitutional questions raised by 
the District Court, however, because we think it clear 
as a matter of statutory construction that the § 411 ( c) 
( 4) limitation on rebuttal evidence is inapplicable to 
operators. By the language of § 411 ( c )( 4), the limita-
tion applies only to "the Secretary" and not to an opera-
tor seeking to avoid liability under § 415 or § 422. And 
this plain language is fortified by the legislative history, 
The Senate Report on § 411 ( c )( 4) specifically states 
that the limitation on rebuttal applies to the Secretary 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, but nowhere sug-
gests that it binds on operator.40 
While apparently recognizing that the § 411 (c)(4) 
limitation on rebuttal evidence could not apply against 
an operator in a Part C determination, the District Court 
believed that the limitation bound an operator in the 
determination of a claim filed during the § 415 transition 
4<l S. Rep. No. 743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 12 (1972) . Similarly, 
-the Conference Report refers to the hmita.tion only as running 
against "the Secretary." S. Rep. No. 780, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at S,; 
(1972) ; H. R. Rep. No. 1048, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (1972) . 
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period, "[s]ince under section [ 415] the operator is 
bound by the Secretary's finding of liability under Part 
B." 385 F. Supp., at 430. In so concluding, the District 
Court was in error. First, it would appear, again from 
the plain language of the statute, that the reference to 
"the Secr,etary" in § 411 ( c )( 4) does not ref er to the Sec-
retary of Labor. On the contrary, § 402 (c) , 30 U.S. C. 
§ 902 (c) (1970 ed.), quite plainly defines "Secretary" 
when used in Part B, including § 411 , as meaning the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, not the 
Secretary of Labor. The Senate Report referred to above 
confirms this conclusion. Even assuming, however, that 
the § 411 ( c )( 4) limitation on rebuttal by "the Secre• 
tary" may be taken to bind the Secretary of Labor inso-
far as he was required to pay benefits for which the 
United States was liable during the transition period, 
§ 415 (a)(l), we have found nothing in the statute or 
in its legislative history to suggest that an operator is 
similarly bound because the Secretary of Labor is also to 
adjudicate the operator's liability. § 415 (a)(5) . In-
deed, such a reading would render a mine operator bound 
by the rebuttal limitation in § 415 transition period 
cases, although not so bound in cases filed thereafter 
under Part C. And that result would be contrary 
to the language of § 415 (a)(5), which prescribes that an 
Operator "shall be bound by the determination of the 
Secretary of Labor [on a § 415 transition period claim} 
as if the claim had been filed pursuant to Part C." 
In short, we conclude that the Act does not itself 
limit the evidence with which an operator may rebut the 
§ 411 (c)(4) presumption. Accordingly, we vacate the 
order of the District Court declaring the § 411 ( c )( 4) 
limitation on rebuttal evidence unconstitutional and en-
joining the Secretary of Labor from limiting evidence in 
rebuttal to the § 411 ( c) ( 4) presumption. Cf. Van Lare 
' ' 
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v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338, 344 (1975); United States v. 
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). 
We are aware that regulations promulgated in 1972 by 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under 
its § 411 (b) authorization, 20 CFR §§ 410.414, 410.454 
( 1975), applicable to Part C determinations under § 422 
(h), and ,expressly adopted in 1973 by the Secretary of 
Labor, 20 CFR § 718 (1975), authorize limitations on 
rebuttal evidence similar to those contained in § 411 (c) 
( 4), and appear to apply in determinations of an opera-
tor's liability. But the Operators' amended complaint 
never challenged the statutory or constitutional validity 
of these r:egulations. 41 Particularly in the absence of 
any mention of the regulations in the opinion and judg-
ment of the District Court, or in the briefs a.nd oral argu-
ments of the parties, we find it inappropriate to consider 
their statutory or constitutional validity at this stage.42 
VI 
In sum, the challenged provisions, as construed, are 
constitutionally sound against the Operators' facial at-
41Jt follows from our discussion of the §411 (c)(4) limitation on 
rebuttal that these regulations cannot stand as authoritative ad-
ministrative interpretations of the statute itself. But the role of 
regulations is not merely interpretative; they may instead be 
designedly creative in a substantive sense, if so authorized. See, 
e. g., Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 
(1973) , If the regulations promulgated here are to be upheld, it 
must be in this latter sense. 
42 We see no reason to remand the case to the three-judge District 
Court for the purpose of determining whether the Operators should 
be granted leave to amend their complaint to include a statutory 
and constitutional challenge to the regulations. The three-judge 
oourt remanded to a single judge all questions regarding the validity 
of regulations challenged in the Operators' complaint, and that 
portion of the case is pending before a single judge. Any motion 
for leave to amend the complaint to include a challenge to any-
ad.ditiona1 regula.tions can be addressed to that single judge. 
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tack. The judgment of the District Court as appealed 
from in No. 74-1316 is affirmed. The judgment of the 
District Court as appealed from in No. 74-1302 is re-
versed, except insofar as it declares unconstitutional, and 
enjoins the operation of, the limitation on rebuttal evi-
dence contained in § 411 ( c )( 4) of the Act. In this 
latter respect, the judgment in No. 74-1302 is vacated, 
and the case remanded with directions to dismiss. 
It is so ordered. 
.. 
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MR. JUSTICE. POWELL. 
Appellants in No. 74-1316, the Operators, challenge as 
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on 
them by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Bene-
fits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. 
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV 
of its opinion. I dissent from Part IV, but concur in 
other portions of the opinion not inconsistent with the 
views herein expressed. 
I 
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the 
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legislation providing benefits to its victims until the 
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of the 
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights 
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard 
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to com-
pensate victims of pneumoconiosis.1 Under Title IV 
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect 
benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411- 414, 30 
U. S. C. §§ 921-924. 2 Miners filing claims after June 30, 
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981,, see ante, at 22-23, 
from their individual employers. § 415, 421-431, 30 
U. S. C. §§ 925, 931-941.3 Under the statute, the class of 
• claimants to which individual employers are liable in-
. eludes both (i) miners employed at the time of or after 
. enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the 
industry at the time of enactment ( "former miners"). 
The unprecedented feature of the Act is tha,t miners 
may be eli ible for benefits from particular coal-mining 
. co~rnspen if the disability upon which -the claim~~ 
( based dev~ ed before e~~c~:1t of the la_w,lana.eventJ 
if the miner was no longer employed in the industry at 
the time of enactment. The Department of Labor 
alread~ has made initial determinations of liability 
1 Title II of the Act prescribes the maintenance of less hazardous 
' mine condition~ in the future. § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841 et 
: seq. 
2 As does t4e Court, I simplify by not distinguishing between 
claims by employees and claims by their survivors. See ante, at 10 
· n. 13. 
3 Claims filed between~uly 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, were 
' to be paid by the Federal Government until January 1, 1974, when 
' they became the responsibility of individual mining concerns. § 415, 
30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining con-
cerns arises only if the claimant does not have recourse to an appli-
_cable state workmen's compensation program approved by the Sec-
retary of Labor, §§ 421-422, 30 U. S. C. §§ 931-932, but no such 
state programs have been approved. See ante, at 4-5. 
.. 
•. 
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1 
l against one of the Operators and in favor of claimants 
/' whose employment terminated decades ago.4 
J~ - II 
The O~rators d? not challenge their liability to miners ~ ~ 
employed at the time of or after enactmen_t which em- :··°Q 
- ----- - ~ bodies f iliar principles of workmen's compensation.5 
The Operators contend, however, that their statuto~ 
liability to former miners has been imposed in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbitrary, 
·, irrational, or discriminatory legislation, see, e. g., Richard-
son v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971), as there is no 
rational justification for imposing liability to former 
miners upon individual mine owners ana thereby com-
petitively disadvantaging them vis-a-vis mining concerns 
not so burdened. 
Congress might have chosen to compensate the former 
miners in question by any of a number of means. It 
might, for example, have made the Federal Government 
liable for all claims by former miners, not simply those 
filed before July 1, 1973. It also might have required 
the entire coal industry to contribute to a general fund 
from which benefits would be paid. But Congress chose 
to require individual employers to pay benefits to their 
former employees. The legislative purpose is both legiti-
@) 
4 Favorable initial determinations have been made for claimants o_,u ,Jjr,JJU.,; Ul'I--\ ~ 
who left mine work in 1920, 1923, 1927, 1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, f'J..1)cµd. -\ o ~> 
1946, and 1948. Brief for Operators, 30 n. 1. These determinations o.~ '9-~~ 1 
rebut the Government's suggestion that in combination the initial J- ~ 
period of federal liability and the statute of limitations specified in , - -
§422 (f)(l), 30 U.S. C. §932 (f)(l), ordinarily will prevent em-
ployer liability for disabilities maturing before passage of the Act. 
See ante, at 11-12, n. 14. 
5 The analogy to workmen's compensation principles is especially 
obvious in light of the express statutory role for state workmen's 
compensation programs. See n. 2, supra. 
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mate and laudable. The question is whether the means 
chosen to achieve the purpose bear "a fair and substan-
tial relation" to that purpose. Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). 
Congress, of course, had broad discretion in choosing 
among possible means. E. g., Richardson, supra; cf. 
'Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U. S. 483 (1954). The 
'Constitution does not require-certainly with respect to 
·'legislation on economic matters-adoption of means most 
·compatible with sound economics or even fairness. But 
'the means adopted must be rational, and in this case 
the evaluation of rationality must take into account the 
·retroactivity of the challenged liability. As the Court uf~.;y 
puts it: 1 )( ✓ ~-.'} 
"The retrospective aspects of the legislation, as wey"' ✓ 
as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due 
process, and the justifications for the latter may not 
suffice for the foi::mer, Thus, in this case the justifi-
cation for the retrospective imposition of liability 
must take into account the possibilities that the 
Operators may not have known of the danger of 
their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and 
that even if they did know of the danger their con-
duct may have been taken in reliance upon the 
current state of the law .... " Ante, at 13. 
The Court purports to recognize that the question of the 
rationality of the individual Operators' liability to former 
miners is a troublesome one, see ante, at 13-14, but it 
nonetheless sustains the challenged provisions. In my 
view, the Court errs in doing so. 
A 
The imposition of liability upon some individual emw 
players but not others might be rational if those bur-
tlened could be viewed as being culpable, in some sense, 
1. , 
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for the harm done to the former miners. Congress, how-
ever, was not of the view that the Operators were indi-
vidually culpable for conducting their businesses in a 
then lawful way and at a time when the dangers of 
pneumoconiosis were not fully realizcd.0 And the Court 
acknowledges today that the Operators' liability cannot 
be rationalized "on any theory of ... blameworthiness." 
Ante, at 13. The purported justification thus must lie 
elsewhere. 
B 
The Court justifies Congress' choice of means as 
follows: 
"We find ... that the imposition of liability for 
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified 
as a rational measure to spread the cost of the em-
ployees' disabilities to those who have profited from 
the fruits of their labor-the o¢ators and .t,he coal 
consumers." Id., at 13-14: -
The 'courltnus relies solely on one of the traditional 
justifications given for workmen's compensation laws.7 ~ ? 
The Operators concede that the ~pread costs" ~" - "II 
6 Even Senator Javits, who played a significant role in the devel-
opment of individual-employer liability, see Brief for Operators, at 
34, thought that the "blame" for past neglect must be shared by 
"all of us," including "the industry, the medical profession, and the 
Government-particularly the Public Health Service." House 
Comm. on Education and Labor, Legislative History / Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act, 338 (Comm. Print 1970) (floor 
remarks). 
7 Another traditional justification for workmen's compensation Jaws 
is that they provide an incentive for employers to maintain safe 
working conditions. The Report of the National Commission on 
State Workmen's Compensation Laws, 38-39, 87 ( 1972). This jus-
tification is not relevant to the Operators' retrospective liability, as 
the Court recognizes. Ante, at 13. 
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makes rational their prospective liability to active and 
future miners. 
"The philosophy underlying workmen's compensa-
tion laws is that economic losses suffered by workers 
as a result of disabling disease and injury incurred 
in connection with their labor should be borne by 
the consume.rs of the products whose production was 
the occasion for their losses. Workmen's compensa-
tion laws achieve this result by transferring the loss 
from the worker to his employer, who is better 
capable of passing the loss on to consumers through 
the price of the product, along with his other costs 
of production." Brief for Operators, 35-36. 
- fh.,_ ~ 
In prospective operation ,~ the- industry-as a whole can I.L ~~~ .:1-...lu., 
.J). spr.ead the costs of pneumoconiosis to-those who benefit c.osh. o.t fll$JJ...ll1? . 
from the miners' labor, and any competitive disadvan- e 1.0~ h 
taging of a firm would reflect a poor record for safety. --tho&e \..ISl..ll:A,~ 
~
civ-Ai But the Act's retroactive liability arises after it is too fu VJ-~ 
M IAckw, ~ fate to take preventive safety measures, and the Opera- aA a.. ~a., 
tors emphasize that such liability en an intl.-i-v:idttalized .SI., r · ~~ 
- ,Ji. ·basis arises after it is too latef to spread costs- especially TO-Y IM,wtU/l;:J.J 
in light of the history and economics of the coal industry. 
Individual firms burdened with compensation payments 
therefore are discriminated against despite the lack of a 
rational relationship to Con ress' pu:cpQse in enacting ..JI 
the Act. 
Cursory examination of the industry reveals the force 
of the Operators' argument. A notable fact about coal 
mining is that the industry currently employs approxi-
mately 150,000 persons, whereas in 1939 it employed 
nearly 450,000. Brief for Operators 24. The reduced 
scale of the coal industry and the liability to survivors, 
as well as to former miners, means that retroactive obli-
gations threaten to be disproportionate to the scale of 
}, W Q.O\. ts ()Ml., 
.s-ti\\ s~ \o 
~ our .0. 
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current operations.8 In itself this might not prevent the 
cost-spreading function relied upon by the Court to 
justify employers' individual liability. But liability to 
former miners is, of course, not randomly disturbed across 
the industry, Rather, it is dictated by historical pat-
terns thaeare unrel. ated to the present contours of the 
industry. o examples are illustrative: (i) Some coal-
mimlTg c ncerns have been in the mining business for 
decades, while competitors have commenced operation 
more recently. The exposure of the former group to 
claims of employees long separa.ted from active employ-
ment will be significantly greater than that of their com-
petitors. (ii) Some companies engaged in coal mining 
in years past on a much larger scale and with many 
more employees than currently. This is not an unusual 
situation in a "depleting asset" industry, where smaller 
companies often lack the resources with which to con-
tinue the acquisition and development of new proper-
ties. Stronger competitors, on the other hand, may have 
operated on a constant or an increasingly large scale.9 
In each case the competitively disadvantaged com-
panies simply will be unable to spread costs in any 
meaningful sense. As already noted, the theory long 
recognized as underlying workmen's compensation laws 
is that economic losses suffered by workers as a result 
of disease or injury should be a current operating ex-
pense, shared by the employer and the consumers _of the 
8 Indeed, the number of former miners and survivors whom an 
individual employer is obliged to compensate could be larger than 
the employer's present workforce. 
9 In addition, the incidence of liability to former miners may be 
skewed artificially by the regulation imposing liability upon the com-
pany which last employed the claimant without regard to previous 
employment with other companies. 20 CFR § 725 .311 (1975). The 
validity of this regulation remains to be considered. See ante, at 
9-10. 
,,, 
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products then produced. In its retroactive operation, 
however, the Act imposes liability after the opportunity 
to spread costs through market forces has passed. In-
dividual operators burdened with retrospective liabilities, 
especially the smaller ones, will be unable to compete 
with those not so burdened, as their current cost of doing 
business will be inflated by benefit payments bearing 
no relation to current operations. The Act's result thus 
is not to spread costs to "the operators and the coal . 
consumers," ante, at 14, but simply to penalize the dis- ~l -~ ~ lJ..., 
advantaged operators despite their conceded lack of \ \\µii _· v- 'r'{I.. a.A\.~" 
culpability.10 This 1scriminatiofi etween burdened -1.,u»-\~ ~"~ 
and unburdened firms has no re ation to Congress' at- ~1 ~ 7 
tempt to enact a cost-spreading mechanism,11 and the Act -\W ~ ~ ~ 
accordingly violates the Fifth Amendment in this ~A-' ~ &.o,l..(.., -
respect. ~ __u- c..c:ru..O .. l ~ 
10 The Court notes that "coal consumers" "profited from the fruit 
-of [former employees'] labor," ante, at 14, and therefore should 
share the burden of benefit payments. This rationale demonstrates 
conclusively the irrationality of the Act's retroactive liability as a 
cost-spreading mechanism. A coal mining concern cannot rctro-
:actively increase its prices to the former customers who benefited 
from the pre-1969 labors of former miners. The only consumers, 
\,...li.U-N-- ~ • 
therefore, who could bear these burdens are those who purchase . 
coal currently. But in a free market such customers cannot be J <-V-J \1\§o.J ~ 
expacteilto]pay reparation add-on for coal produced by disadvan- ~ .s~ ..A.MU... 
taged coal companies when the same product is readily obtainable ~t.. ~ t)l'11 ........,,,..._,.._ 
from others at a lower price. The result must be to make the bur- ~ '-
dened companies uncompetitive. ~ (i,...C-A • 
11 The penalizing of concededly blameless firms with larger num-
bers of diseased former employees is irrational only because of the 
retroactive nature of the liability. In their prospective application 
it is rational for Title IV and other workmen's compensation schemes 
to disadvantage competitively employers who take less effective 
precautions to protect their employees. See --, -- n. 5, supra. 
But only prospective liability creates an incentive for occupational 
safety measures. 
74-1302 & 74-1316-CONCUR AND DISSENT 
USERY v. TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO. 9 
C 
The Court apparently fails to recognize the invidious 
nature of this discrimination despite its acknowledgment 
that the justifications that rationalize prospectivOegisla-
tion may not rationalize retrospective legislation. The 
Court's error, as I view it, may stem in part from its 
frequent rejection in the past of challenges to legisla-
tion that had some retroactive application. See ante, 
at 12. It therefore is appropriate to note how little 
support previous cases off er for today's holding. The 
Court cites three cases as standing for the proposition 
that "a new duty or liability [might be] based on past 
acts," ante, at 12. In Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co., 
290 U.S. 163 (1933), however, the question was whether 
a verdict in a breach-of-contract case could include in-
terest when the statute providing for the assessment of 
interest was passed after the claim arose. Funkhouser 
thus differed significantly from this case, as the statute 
provided only an additional remedial component for the 
breach of a duty already defined. Lichter v. United 
States, 334 U. S. 742 (1948), and Welch v. Henry, 305 
U. S. 134 (1938), were both essentially tax cases, a 
category of cases that are virtually sui generis, as the 
Court recognized in Welch. 12 While drawing no signifi-
cant support from these cases, the Court finds it neces-
sary to distinguish the case most directly in point-Rail-
road Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 
(1935). I am not persuaded by the Court's distinction 
of Alton, which turns on an asserted difference between 
industrial "human wastage," Alton, supra, at 384 
12 Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938): "Taxation is neither 
a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes 
by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government 
among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its bene-
fits and must bear its burdens." 
e 
" ' .. 
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(Hughes, C. J., dissenting), stemming from age and that 
stemming from disease. It seems to me that Congress J\n ,, ~ 6:\ u-kc. ~ ? 
is equally entitled to allocate f_ffie costs of e1t er age or -f"'u,,'-'\-· - - J ' 
disease "to the [employer as] an actual, measurable cost 
of his business," ante, at 15. As a unanimous Court 
found the retroactive imposition of pension benefits was Lk.,0 lJ) ..9.,JVJ ~ 
impermissible in Alton, the retroactive imposition of the ~
benefits in question here also should be impermissible. ---J 
III 
For the foregoing reasons I would hold the Act uncon-
.stitutional insofar as it requires the Operators to pay 
benefits to miners not employed on the date of its en-
actment.18 In my view, it simply is not rational to 
structure a legislative remedy in a way that imposes on 
'one class of coal mining concerns a burden that, under 
'the circumstances, fairly belongs on the entire industry 
br on the public at large. 
9 vJ->-{> d.OJ lt ,AA.ov..Q.d) 
JJ-h..~~~~ ~ ~ not 
~ ~ '"\~3h4L ) J ~ ~ 
~ ~~J'C-,IJ..,-,,..,. ~r~~~Jsi._ 
 ~ ..k\.U-Ou.l& '-~ 0. ~ -




13 Section 510 of the Act, see note at 30'Y. S. C. § 802, provides v~ -f.o 
that the invalidity of any application of the Act shall not affect the d.o (~ 
application of the Act to other "persons or circumstances." • • 
In light of the judgment of the Court, I do not deem it necessary 1.. ~ ~ ~L V·· 
.t_o consider whether the Act authorizes the Federal Government to \. Lt, JJ.~ 
~ay benefits to former miners filing after June 30, 1973, despite --~ l..'\.1...Q.~ 
the constitutional bar I perceive against the retroactive imposition ,-- • 
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MR. JusTICE ST:mWi\RT, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part 
Although I agree with much of the Court's opinion, I 
cannot join that opinion for at least two reasons. 
A 
In upholding the constitutiona.I validity of the irre-
buttable presumption contained in § 411 (c)(3) of the 
Act . now before us, the Court's opinion does not so much 
as mention the decision of this Court tha,t s,eems to me 
wholly dispositive. I refer to Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 
U. S. 749, decided less than a year ago. The Court in 
that case, relying -1.nter alia on Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 l L S, 471 1 :.tnd Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78) 
" . ;-
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· clearly established the constitutional standa,,rd for legis-
lation of the kind before us here : 
" [T]he question raised is not whether a statutory 
provision precisely filters out those, and only those, 
who are in the factual position which generated the 
congressional concern reflected in the statute. Such 
a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions .... 
Nor is the question whether the provision filters 
out a substantial part of the class which caused 
congressional concern, or whether it filters out more 
members of the class than nonmembers. The ques-
tion is whether Congress, its concern having been 
reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse 
which it legitimately desired to avoid, could ra~ 
tionally have concluded both that a particular lim-
. itation or qualification would protect against its 
occurrence, and that the expense and other diffi-
culties of individual determinations justified the 
inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule .. . , 
422 U. S., at 777. 
The provision of § 411 (c) (3) at issue surely passes 
muster under this standard, and I would uphold it oh 
that basis rather than upon the grounds discussed by 
the Court. Ante, at 17- 20. 
B 
I cannot accept the Court's conclusion, ante, at 32-34, 
that the limitation on rebuttal evidence in § 411 ( c) ( 4), 
30 U.S. C. § 921 (c)(4) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), is inappli-
cable to "transition" determinations under § 415 insofar 
as those determinat10ns bind operators. Section 415 
· (a)(5), 30 U.S. C. § 925 (a)(5), provides tha.t an "op-
erator . . shall be bound by the determinations of the 
Secretary of Labor r on a transition] claim as if the· 
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chapter and section 932 of this title had been applicable 
to such operator." As the Court correctly observes, 
the critical question is thus whether the § 411 ( c) ( 4) 
limitation would apply "if the claim had b~en filed pur-
suant to part C ... and section 932 . ... " 
The Court reads the "plain language" of § 411 ( c) ( 4), 
and in particular the reference to "the Secretary [ of 
Health, Education and Welfare]," to mean that "the 
limitation applies only to 'the Secretary' and not to an 
operator sr,eking to avoid liability under § 415 [30 
U. S. C. § 925] or § 422 [30 U. S. C. § 932] ." Ante, at, 
32. This reading, the Court concludes, is "fortified by 
the legislative history" and in particular by .the "Senate 
Report on § 411 ( c )( 4) [which] specifically states that 
the limitation on rebuttal applies to the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, but nowhere suggests 
that it binds an operator." Ibid. 
The Court's analysis omits any · consideration of the• 
effect of § 430, 30 U. S. C. § 940, which provides as 
follows : 
"The amendments made by the ·Black Lung Bene-
fits Act of 1972 to part B of thi_s subchapter shall,. 
to the extent appropriate, also apply to [Part Cl: 
Provided, That for the purpose of determining the 
applic~bility of the presumption established by seo-
tion 921 (c) ( 4) of this title to claims filed under this 
part, no period of employment after June 30, 1971, 
shall be considered in determining whether a miner 
was employed at least fifteen years in one or more 
underground mines." 
Since the limitation on rebuttal evidence in§ 411 (c)(4) 
was created by the "amendments made by the Black 
Lung Benefits Act of 1972" it would seem to follow that 
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inference is reinforced by the Senate Report, which 
stated : 
"New section 430 requires that amendments to 
part B be applied, wherever appropriate, ta part ,C. 
"Questions were raised during the Committee de-
liberations over whether the amendments to part B 
would automatically be applicable, where appropri .. 
aLe, to part C. 
• Q ,., 
HAithough it would appear clear that the same 
standards are to govern, the Committee concluded 
that it would be best to so specify. 
"It is contemplated by the Committee that the 
applicable portions of fo1lowing sections of part B, 
as amended, would apply to part C: section 411, sec-
tion 412 ( except the last sentence of subsection (b) 
thereof), section 413, and section 414." Senate Re-
port, at 2L 
See also Senate Report, at 33. 
The only play in the tight linkage of Part C to the 
amendments to Part B is that 1'-ff orded by the proviso 
in § 430 and by the phrase "to the e;xtent appropriate" 
which appears in that section. The proviso does not re-• 
move the rebuttal limitation, but it does alter § 411 ( c) 
(4)'s allocation of the burden of proof in another cru-
cial respect : It limits the period of employment which 
may be considered for purposes of determining the appli-
cabil ty of the presumption. The presence of the proviso 
is relevant in two respects. First, it underscor~s the basic 
applicability to Part C determinations of the § 411 ( c) ( 4) 
rebuttal presumpt10n. Second, it demonstrates that 
Congress knew how to place a significant limitation on 
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The care and precision which Congress used in drafting 
this qualifying language bears on the propriety of read~ 
ing the phrase "to the extent appropriate" as obliquely 
qualifying the applicability of the rebuttal limitation to 
Part C determinations. That limitation is part and par~ 
eel of an elaborate reallocation of the burden of proving 
disability resulting frem pneumoconiosis. Under prior 
Social Security procedure "if an x-ray [ did] not show 
totally disabling pneumoconiosis, no further processing 
of a claim [was] allowed. Th us, any further evidence of 
disability [was] not allowed if the x-ray show[ed] neg~ 
ative." Senate Report, at 11. This heavy reliance on 
X-ray evidence had unfortunate consequences for coal 
miners because of the inability of X.-ray examinations 
to detect pneumoconiosis in some instances. Congress 
responded to this particular problem by 
"prohibiting denial of a claim solely on the basis of 
an X-ray, by providing a presumption of pneumo. 
coniosis for miners with respiratory or pulmonary 
disability where they have worked 15 years or more 
in a coal mine, and by requiring the Social Security 
Administration to use tests other than the X-ray to 
I 
establish the basis for a judgment that a miner is or 
i not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis." 
Ibid, 
The 15-year rebuttable presumption embodied in § 411 
( c) ( 4) was perhaps the most significant feature of Con ... 
gress' response. Based in part on testimony of the Sur-
geon General that "[f]or work periods greater than 15 
years underground, there was a linear increase in the 
prevalence of the disease with years spent u11derground,''' 
id., at 13, the presumption embodied a congression1:1,l de-
cision to "giv[e] the benefit of the doubt,'' id., at 11, to 
a specific class of claimants totally disabled bf respiratory 
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evidence that the impainnent resulted from pneumo..-
coniosis. The presumption was rebuttable only if the 
respondent could show eith~r ,that "(A) such miner does, 
not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (B) his, 
respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, 
or in connection with, employment in a coal mine." 
§ 411 (c) (4), 30 U.S. C. § 921 (c) (4) . 
It is difficult to believe that Congress would have 
used the phrase "to the extent appropriate" in § 430 w 
withdraw the protection of the rebuttal limitation under 
Part C while retaining the rebuttable presumption of 
which it is an integral part. Such an interpretation is, 
inconsistent with the care Congress displayed in draft-
ing the § 430 proviso. Moreover, it leads necessarily t<Y 
other improbable results. The Court's approach, for in-
stance, necessarily implies that Congress extended the 
benefit of the § 411 ( c) ( 4) presumption to "surface, -as 
well as underground, miners [in specified circum-
stances]," Senate Report, at 2, with the intention that" 
the protection would lapse as soon as Part C came into 
play. The revelant sentence in§ 411 (c)(4) states that 
''[t]he Secretary [of Health, Education and W'elfare] 
shall not apply all of a portion of the requirement of 
this paragraph that the miner work in an underground 
mine where he determines that conditions of a miner's 
employment in a coal mine other than an imdergrouncf 
mine were substantially similar to conditions in an under• 
ground mine." (Emphasis added.) If the operative 
principle is that provisions in § 411 (c)(4) which bind 
'"the Secretary [of Health, Education and Welfare]" are· 
automatically "inappropriate" for Part C proceedingsi 
then surface miners would be stripped of the benefits of 
§ 411 ( c) ( 4) as soon as the legislative scheme enters its:: 
tl'ansitional stag~. 
Moreover, the Court's. reading of the statute is:: 
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a,nomalous in terms of the overall structure of Part C, 
The primary goal of Congress in framing Part C was ta 
transfer adjudicatory responsibilities over coal miners' 
pneumoconiosis claims to state workmen's compensation 
tribunals, but only if the state compensation law was 
found by the Secretary of Labor to provide "standards 
for determining death or total disability due to pneu-
moconiosis . . . substantially equivalent to . . . those 
standards established under part B of this subchap-
ter .... " Section 421 (b)(2)(C), 30 U.S. C. § 931 (b) 
(2) (C). One of the Part B standards is the rebuttal 
limitation in§ 411 (c)(4). Thus, the Secretary of La-
bor would not be empowered to approve a state law 
which did not contain a "substantially equivalent" evi-
dentiary limitation, ' 
The delegation of adjudicatory responsibility to the 
Secretary of Labor under Part C was a backstop meas-
ure, intended to provide a forum· for presentation of 
claims during any period after January 1, 1974, when a 
state workmen's compensation law was not included on 
the Secretary of Labor's list of state laws with provisions 
"substantially equivalent" to those in Part B. § 421 (a), 
30 U. S. C. § 931 (a). See Senate Report, at 19~21. 
Since the very reason for withholding i:i,pproval of a 
state law and providing an alternative federal forum is 
lack of "substantial equivalence" between the state law 
provisions and the "standards established under part B," 
including the rebuttal limitation in § 411 ( c) ( 4), it 
would be anomalous if the substitute federal forum could 
employ evidentiary rules which deviate substantially 
from those in Part B. 
The statutory language and legislative history simply 
will not yield such an unlikely result. The phrase "toi 
·the extent appropriate" in § 430, 30 U. S. C. § 940,. 
·plainly refers to language in part B which has no rele--
,. 
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vance to Part C, notably the language that specifies that 
"the Secretary [of Health, Education and Welfare] " is 
to have certain adjudicative responsibilities. These are 
the references that are not "appropriate" under Part C, 
because Part C transfers adjudicative responsibilities to 
the States or, in the alternative, to the Secretary of 
Labor. The obvious purpose of the phrase "to the ex-
tent appropriate" is to accommodate minor linguistic 
variations resulting from this transfer of responsibility. 
Thus, the interaction of the phrase "to the extent appro-
priate" and the reference to "the Secretary" in the re-
buttal limitation of § 411 ( c) ( 4) does not render the en-
tire limitation "inappropriate" to Part C proceedings; 
it merely renders the reference to "the ~ecretary" inap-
propriate under Part C. 
It is significant that the Court's interpretation of 
§ 411 ( c) ( 4) 's rebuttal limitation is not urged or even 
suggested by any party to this suit. The Government's > 
position is that the District Court erred by reading § 411 
(c)(4) to foreclose a showing that would refute total 
disability. The Government is clearly correct. The 
§ 411 (c)(4) presumption comes into play only after the 
claimant establishes total disability. See § 411 ( c)( 4) , 
30 U. S. C. § 921 (c)(4) (" . .. and if other evidence 
demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respira-
tory or pulmonary impairment, then there shall be a re-
buttable presumption . . . . "). In addition, the District 
Court ruled that§ 411 (c)(4) places upon a specific coal 
mine owner the burden of proving that the respiratory 
or pulmonary disease did not arise out of coal mine 
employment. The Government urges that this con-
struction is erroneous, because it overlooks the fact that 
under 30 U. S. C. § 932 (c) a specific operator can also 
defeat liability by showing that the disability did not 
arise, even in part, out of employment in his mine dur-
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ing the period when he operated it. Again, the Govern-
ment is clearly correct. If the operator makes the § 932, 
( c) showing, then the § 411 ( c )( 4) presumption- and 
the rebuttal limitation-is irrelevant. Accordingly, I 
would reverse the District Court's ruling that the § 411 
( c) ( 4) rebuttal limitation violates the Constitution. 
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MR. JUSTICE PoWELLJ C.o ()<.I.\, w(' It'\~• 
Appellants in No. 74---1316, the Operators, challenge as 
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on 
them by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Bene-
fits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. 
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV 
of its op1111on. -r\liflialrt fur rn Pert IY, bat concur in 
other portions of the opinion not inconsistent with the 
views herein expressed. 
I 
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the 
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legislation providing benefits to its victims until the 
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of the 
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights 
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard 
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to com-
pensate victims of pneumoconiosis.1 Under Title IV 
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect 
benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411-414, 30 
U. S. C. §§ 921-924.2 Miners filing claims after June 30, 
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981,. see ante, at 22-23~ n. zs; 
from their individual employers. § 415, 421-431, 30 
U.S. C. §§ 925, 931-941.3 Under the statute, the class of 
claimants to which individual employers are liable in-
·cludes both (i) miners employed at the time of or after 
enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the 
industry at the time of enactment ("former miners"). 
The un recedented feature of the Act is that miners 
may be eligib e benefits from~rticular coal-mining ~ 
concern/atii!@M ii Y,o il.iaobiJ~~, ·1 r a u •· l nm @IE1im1f! HO 
liuul i;louolop10d luhu !!I ut 11 t sf tl I I , AB9 even 
if the miner was no longer employed in the industry at 
' the time of enactment. The Department of Labor 
• already has made initial determinations of liability 
1 Title II of the Act prescribes the maintenance of less hazardous 
· mine conditions in the future. § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841 et 
seq. 
2 As does the Court, I simplify by not distinguishing between 
claims by employees and claims by their survivors. See ante, at 10 
D. 13. 
3 Claims filed between July 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, were 
to be paid by the Federal Government until January 1, 1974, when 
they became the responsibility of individual mining concerns. § 415, 
· :30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining con-
cerns arises only if the claimant does not haYe recourse to an appli-
cable state workmen's compensation program approved by the Sec-
retary of Labor, §§ 421-422, 30 U. S. C. §§ 931-932, but no such 
state programs have been approved. See ante, at 4-5. 
', . . 
.. . ,,
.. 




against one of the Operators and in favor of claimants 
4 
whose employment terminated decades ago. 
II. 
The Operators do not challenge their liability 
to miners employed at the time of or after enactment, a 
liability which accords with familiar principles of work.men's 
. 5 compensation. They contend, however, ~hat a statutory 
I 
liability to former miners has been imposed in violation of 
• • 
' -~ ,, 
l", •'~ 
the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbitrary, irrational, ; 
or discriminatory legislation, see,~-~·, Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971), as there is no rational 
justification for imposing liability to former miners upon 
individual mine owners. 
The Court recognizes that its evaluation of the 
rationality of the employers' challenged liability must 
take into account the retroactive nature of the liability: t 
'~he retrospective aspects of the 
legislation, as well as the prospective 
aspects, must meet the test of due 
process, and the justifications for the 
latter may not suffice for the former. 
Thus, in this case the justification for 
the retrospective imposition of liability 
4. 
must take into account the possibilities 
that the Operators may not have known of 
the danger of their employees' contracting 
pneumoconiosis, and that even if they did 
know of the danger their conduct may have 
been taken in reliance ur.on the current 
state of the law • . • • ' Ante, at 13. 
The Court then acknowledges that the Act would not be 
justified "on any theory of deterrence •.. or blame-
worthiness." Id., at 13. It nonetheless sustains the 
provisions for retroactive liability, reasoning as follows: 
''We find ... that the imposition 
of liability for the effects of disabilities 
bred in the past is justified as a rational 
measure to spread the cost of the employees' 
disabilities to those who have profited from 
the fruits of their labor - the operators and 
the coal consumers." Id., at 13-14. 
* * ..,., ..,._ 
''We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of 
Congress' chosen scheme by examining the 
degree to which the 'cost-savings' enjoyed by 
operators in the pre-enactment period produced 
'excess' profits, or the degree to which the 
retrospective liability imposed on the early 
operators can now be passed on to the consumer. 
It is enough to say that the Act approaches the 
problem of cost-spreading rationally." Id., 
at 14-15. -
In my view whether the retroactive liability is 
constitutional is a considerably closer question than the 










liability as a cost-spreading device is highly questionable. 
I turn first to the question of cost-spreading to the Operators. 
If coal mining concerns actually enjoyed "excess" profits 
in the preenactment period by virtue of their nonliability 
for pneumoconiosis, and if such profits could be quanitified 
in some discernible way, Congress rationally could redistribute 
the profits to former miners whose uncompensated illnesses 
created them. But, in this content, the term ''excess 
profits" must mean profits over and above those that 
Operators would have made in years and decades past if 
they had set aside from current operations funds sufficient 
to provide the compensation, although under no obligation 
to do so. It is unlikely that such profits existed. Coal 
prices are determined in the market by normal competitive 
forces. One therefore would expect that, had a compensation 
increment been added to operating costs, the Operators 
simply would have passed it on to consumers, thereby 
leaving their profit return unaffected. 
Nor can I accept without serious question the Court's 
view that the costs now imposed by the Act may be passed on 
to consumers. Firms burdened with retroactive 
payments must meet that expense from current production 
and current sales in a market where prices must be 





One ordinarily would expect that if burdened finns are 
to meet both competitive prices and their retroactive 
obligations, their profits necessarily will be less than 
those of their competitors. Thus, the burdened finns 
in all likelihood will have to bear the costs of the 
retroactive liability rather than passing those costs on 
to consumers. And they must bear such costs quite without 
regard to whether "excess profits" may have been made in 
1 . 6 some ear ier years. 
• I In some industries conditions might be such that 
cost-spreading to consumers would not be prevented by a 
competitive disadvantaging of burdened firms. It seems 
most unlikely, however, that the coal industry is such an 
industry. A notable fact about coal mining is that the 
industry currently employs only about 150,000 persons, 
whereas in 1939 it employed nearly 450,000. Brief for 
Operators 24. The reduced scale of employment in the coal 
industry, combined with the liability to former miners and their 
survivors, means that retroactive obligations almost 
certainly will be disproportionate to the scale of current 
7 
operations. Moreover, it is unlikely that liability to 
fonner miners will be distributed randomly across the 
industry, as it is dictated by historical patterns that 






industry. Two examples are illustrative: (i) Some 
coal-mining concerns have been in the mining business for 
decades, while some competitors have commenced operation 
more recently. The exposure of the former group to claims 
of employees long separated from active employment is 
likely to be significantly greater than that of their 
competitors. (ii) Some companies engaged in coal mining 
in years past on a much larger scale and with many more em-
ployees than currently. This is not an unusual situation 
in a "depleting asset" industry, where smaller companies 
often lack the resources with which to continue the 
acquisition and development of new properties. Stronger 
competitors, on the other hand, may have operated on a 
8 
constant or an increasingly large scale. In each case 
the competitively disadvantaged companies may be unable 
to spread a substantial portion of their costs to consumers. 
In view of these considerations it is unrealistic to think 
that the Act will spread costs to "the operators and the 
coal consumers," ante, at 14, and thus I question the Court's 
conclusion that the Act is rational in imposing retroactive 
liability. 
III. 
Despite the foregoing, I must concur in the 
• judgment on the record before us. Congress had broad 
i, .• 
8. 
discretion in formulating a statute to deal with the 
serious problem of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners. 
E.~., Richardson, supra; cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 
348 U.S. 483 (1955). Nor does the Constitution require 
that legislation on economic matters be compatible with 
sound economics or even with normal fairness. As a result, 
economic and remedial social enactments carry a strong 
presumption of constitutionality,. e.g, United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938), and the 
Operators had the heavy burden of showing the Act to be 
unconstitutional. 
The constitutionality of the retrospective 
liability in question here ultimately turns on the 
sophisticated questions of economic fact suggested above. 
In this case, decided on the Government's motion for 
sunnnary judgment, the Operators have failed to make factual 
....... ....,ltr..-Xt.• 
showings that support their sweeping assertions of 
irrationality. Although I find these assertions strongly 
suggestive that Congress has acted irrationally in pursuing 
a legitimate 
sufficient -
end, I am not satisfied that they are I 
evf>/:~;~;;;_ ~f.>-~7'; . -
in the absence of~ factualAshow1ng - to 1\ ,. 
override the presumption of constitutionality. Accordingly, 
I agree that the Government was entitled to sunnnary judgment 







4. Favorable initial determinations have been 
made for claimants who left mine work in 1920, 1923, 1927, 
1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, 1946, and 1948. Brief for 
Operators, 30 n. 1. These determinations rebut the 
Government's suggestion that in combination the initial 
period of federal liability and the statute of limitations 
specified in§ 422(f)(l), 30 U.S.C. § 932(f)(l), will 
prevent employer liability to miners . who left the industry · 
before 
/passage of the Act. See ante, at 11-12, n. 14. 
5. Congress apparently recognized that the 
employers burdened by retroactive liability were not 
blameworthy. Senator Javits, who played a significant role 
in the development of individual-employer liability, see 
Brief for Operators, at 34, thought that the "blame" 
for past neglect must be shared by "all of us", including 
"the industry, the medical profession, and the Government -
particularly the Public Health Service o" House Comm. on 
Education and Labor, Legislative History/Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act, 338 (Comm. Print 1970)(floor remarks). 
The retroactive nature of the liability makes 
deterrence an insufficient justification. In their 
prospective application, it is rational for Title IV and 
other workmen's compensation schemes to disadvantage 





to protect their employees. But only prospective 
liability creates an incentive for occupational safety 
measures. 
6. It is, of course, impossible to spread 
the cost to "coal consumers" who "profited from the fruit 
of [former employees'] labor." Ante, at 14. A coal 
mining concern cannot retroactively increase its prices 
to the former customers who benefitted from the pre-1969 
labors of former miners. The only consumers, therefore, 
who could bear these burdens are those who purchase coal 
currently. But in a free market such customers cannot 
be expected to pay a reparation add-on for coal produced 
by disadvantaged coal companies when the same product is 
readily obtainable from others at a lower price. 
7. Indeed, the number of former miners and 
survivors whom an individual employer is obliged to compensate 
could be larger than the employer's present workforce. 
8. In addition, the incidence of liability to former 
miners may be skewed artifi~ially by the regulation imposing 
liability upon the company which last employed the claimant 





~ , . 
J ' 
20 CFR § 725.311 (1975). 
remains to be considered. 
/V ,.- ~-· 
The validity of this regulation 













LFP/gg 6-25-76 Rider A. p. 9 
In this case, decided on the Government's motion for 
sumnary judgment, the operators have failed to make factual 
showings that support their sweeping assertions of 
irrationality. Although I find these assertions strongly 
suggestive that Congress has ahosen an irrational means 
to attain a legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they 
are sufficient - in the absence of proof - to override 
the presumption of constitutionality. Accordingly, I 
agree that the Government was entitled to sunma.ry judgment 
on this record. 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Appellants in No. 74-1316, the Operators, challenge as 
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on 
them by the Federal Coal Mine I!ealth and Safety Act of 
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Bene-
fits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq, 
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV 
of its opinion. I concur in the judgment as to Part IV, 
and concur in other portions of the opinion not inconsist-
ent with the views herein expressed. 
I 
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the 
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legislation providing benefits to its victims until the 
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of the 
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights 
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard 
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to com-
pensate victims of pneumoconiosis.1 Under Title IV 
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect 
benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411-414, 30 
U. S. C. §§ 921-924.2 Miners filing claims after June 30, 
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981, see ante, at gg 93, 
n. ~, from their indiviµQal employers. § 415, 421-431, 30 
U.S. C. §§ 925, 931-941.3 Under the statute, the class of 
claimants to which individual employers are liable in-
cludes both (i) miners employed at the time of or a.fter 
enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the 
industry at the time of enactment ("former miners"). 
The unprecedented feature of the Act is that miners-
may be eligible to receive benefits from a particular coal-
mining concern even if the miner was no longer em-
ployed in the industry at the time of enactment. The 
Department of Labor already has made initial deter-
minations of liability against one of the Operators anc:T 
1 Title II of the Act prescribes the maintenance of less hazardous 
mine conditions in the future. § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841 et · 
.seq. 
2 As does the Court, I simplify by not distinguishing between 
claims by employees and claims by their survivors. See ante, at 10, 
n. 13. 
8 Claims filed between July 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, wer&-
to be paid by the Federal Government until ~fflffrrt,~1"4.,.,wliaa,.,{ 
_/ 
they became the respollilibility of individual mining concerns. § 415,. 
'30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining con-
cerns arises only if the claimant does not have recourse to an appli-
cable state workmen's compensation program approved by the Sec-• 
retary of Labor, §§ 421-422, 30 U. S. C. §§ 931-932, but no sucl._ 
sJ;ate l?rogi:aUIS have been approved. See ante, at 4--5. 
2.,-0-, 
\ 
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in favor of claimants whose employment terminated 
decades ago.4 
II 
The Operators do not challenge their liability to miners 
employed at the time of or after enactment, a liability 
which accords with familiar principles of workmen's 
compe11sation. 5 They contend, however, that a statu-
tory liability to former miners has been imposed in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbi-
trary, irrational, or discriminatory legislation, see, e. g., 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971), as there 
is no ra.tiona,l justifica.tion for imposing liability to 
former miners upon individual mine owners .. 
/ 
The Court recognizes that its evaluation of the ra-
avorable initial determinations have been made for claimants 
left mine work in ~ 1923, 1927, 1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, 
, and 1948. Brief for Operators, 30 n. 1. These determinations 
rebut the Government's suggestion that in combination the initial 
period of federal liability and the statute of limitations specified in 
§422 (f)(l), 30 U.S. C. §932 (f)(l), will prevent employer lia-
bility to miners who left the industry before passage of the Act . 
See ante, at 11-12, n. 14. 
5 Congress apparently recognized that the employe.rs burdened 
by retroactive liability were not blameworthy. Sena.tor Javits, who 
, played a significant role in the development of individual-employer 
liability, see Brief for Operators, at 34, thought that the "blame" 
for past neglect must he shared by "all of u4," including "the in-
dustry, the medical profession, and the Govhnment-particularly 
the Public Health Service." House Comm. on Education and Labor, 
Legislative History /Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 338 
(Comm. Print 1070) (floor remarks) . 
The retroactive nature of the liability makes deterrence an in-
sufficient justification. In their prospective application, it is ra-
tional for Title IV and other workmen's .compensation schemes to 
disadvantage competitively employers who take less effective pre-
cautions to protect their employees. But only prospective liability-
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tionality of the employers' challenged liability must take 
'into account the retroactive nature of the liability : 
"The retrospective aspects of .._legislation, as well 
as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due 
process, and the justifications for the latter may not 
suffice for the former, Thus, in this case the justifi-
cation for the retrospective imposition of liability 
must take into account the possibilities that the · 
Operators may not have known of the danger of 
their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and 
that even if they did know of the danger their con-
duct may have been taken in reliance upon the 
current state of the law .... " Ante, at ~ 
The Court then acknowledges that the Act would not be 
justified "on any theory of deterrence . . . or blame-
worthiness." Id., at 13. It nonetheless sustains the 
provision, for retroactive liability, re&soning as follows : 
"We find . . . that the imposition of liability for 
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified 
as a rational measure to spread the cos~ of the em-
ployees' disabilities to those who have profited from 
the fruits of their labor-the operators and the cpal 
consumers." Id., at 13-14. 
, "We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress' 
chosen scheme by examining the degree to which the 
'cost-savings' enjoyed by operators in the pre-enact-
ment period produced 'excess' profits, or the degree 
to which the retrospective liability imposed on the 
early operators can now be passed on to the con-
sumer. It is enough to say that the Act approaches 
the problem of cost-spreading rationall~' Id., at 
14-15. ------In my view whether the retroactive liability is consti-
_/ 
s 
it ✓ . . " . 
f 
I, 
I· ,. . 
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tutional is a considerably closer question than the Court's 
treatment suggests. The rationality of retrospective lia-
bility as a cost-spreading device is highly questionable. 
p;0a.ding to tb" 
If coal mining concerns actually enjoyed "excess" 
profits in the pre-enactment period by virtue of their 
•', 
,. 
nonliability for pneumoconiosis, and if such profits could t. 
be quantified in some discernible way, Congress ra.tion- ~ , ! -; , 
ally could rediiltrib1:1te the prefttis t6 fo1me1 miner.s-wb:ose-~mpDS. €- · 7f'~ [ i 
--~r--mireomp~~~-ttffi~~if'tea~t0~'1~tU;ih~e,iuw.. But, in this con- l,a.b,I 1 --1¼ ~f;t · 
te1t, the term "excess profits" must mean profits over ~ rt\ 1 riU'Y.l ~Cal) eJ 
V:
nd above those that Operators would have made in / 11 "' 
perations funds sufficient to provide ~ compensation, ~ 
years and decades past if they hll,d set aside from current ✓ ✓· 
although under no obligation to do so. It is unlikely 
that such profits existed. ~ftrt-'m"N~-ftf't~~~ft9€1--l.Jlv -,ic,. ~ ,~~\-~ ,:S 
h,~~~~ 
~ tl,U'I./Y'I ,a I I\\ cV"\Q... 
). 
fore would expect that, had a compensation increment 
been a.dded to operating costs, the Operators simply 
. mp D would have passed,.lit on to consumers, thereby eavmg 
~1•~h, lqfivt~ ~J:thll:e~iJ;.:.JlriP4c~an~I~a~cilollc:&ep-ttH'w~i~~hetou;et~serious question the Court's 
~~• '-4..J ~L: ~-ket -,.,, 
• 
~--f4 I~ f<Vvv.,.._ ~ +.e.c;{~, ¥\ sM-t,t, view that the costs now imposed by the Act may be· 
-I( _J,,,. r., lk ~ I~ "'"' AJ.. ) d b d h 1N.. 7~ . { _,__..._ passe on to consumers. Firms ur ened wit retro-
~ # ~ SA\.L,. active payments must meet that ~xpense from current 
?"e. 4 t sk, ~ ¥ i~ production and current sales in a market where prices 
we..ol¼ ~ h+w-e, must be competitive with the prices of firms not so 
J I · ' burdened. One ordina.rily would expect that if burdened' 
firms are to meet both competitive prices and their retro-
active obligations, their profits necessarily will be less 
than those of their competitors. Thus, the burdened 
firms in all likelihood will have to bear the costs of the 
retroactive liability rather than passing those costs on_...--
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without regard to whether "excess profits" may have 
been made in some earlier years.6 
1 , n some industries conditions might be such that~ 
. vett!ieEl lw a 
Q....~t>Q:~tMii'l:¥€1-Q;~~~~¼'l'ii~P"Q-YI~~s. It seems 
most unlikely, however, that the coal industry is such 
an industry. A notable fact about coal mining is that 
the industry currently employs only about 150,,000 per-
sons, whereas in 1939 it employed nearly 450,000.. Brief 
for Operators 24. The reduced scale of employment •in 
the coal industry, combined with the liability to former 
miners and their survivors, mean,s that retroactive obli-
gations almost certainly will be disproportionate to the 
scale of current operations..7 Moreover, it is unlikely 
1
. 
that · liability to former miners will be distributed ran-
domly across the industry, as it · is dictated by historical 
patterns that may · be wholly unrelated to the present 
contours of the industry, Two examples arn~llµstrative: 
(i) Some coal-mining concerns have been in the n:µning 
business for decades, while some competitors have com-
menced operation more recently. · The exposure of the 
former group to claims of employees long separf:\,ted from 
active employment is likely to be significantly greater 
th~n that of their competitors. (ii) Some companies 
_, t • ' 
· 6 'It is, of course, impossibie to spread the cost to "coal consumers" 
hJ' I ' '•/ w o "profited from the frui'J\ of [former employees'] labor." Ante, 
at 14. A coal mining concern cannot retroactively increase its prices 
to the former customers who beqefitted from the pre-1969 labors 
of former miners. The only consumers, therefore, who could bear 
these burdens are those who purchase coal currently. But in a 
free market such customers cannot be expected to pay a reparation 
add-on for coal produced by disadv11,ntagecl coal companies when the 
same product is readily obtainable from others at a lower price. 
7 Indeed, the number of ' former miners and survivors whom an: 
individual employer is obliged to compensate ooµld be larger than 
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engaged in coal mining in years past on a much larger 
scale and with many more employees than currently. 
This is not an unusual situation in a "depleting asset'' 
industry, where smaller companies often lack the re-
sources with which to continue the acquisition and de-..._,_;.;.;c'""' 
velopment of new properties. Stronger competitors, on 
the other hand, may have operated on a constant or an 
increasingly large scale.8 In each case the competitively 
disadvantaged companies may be unable to spread a 
substantial portion of their costs to consumers. In view 
of these considerations it is unrealistic to think that the 
Act will spread costs to "the operators and the coal con-
sumers," ante, at 14, and thus I question the Court's 
conclusion that the Act is rational in imposing retro-
active liability. 
III 
Despite the foregoing, I must concur in the judgment 
on the record before us. Congress had broad discretion 
in formulating a statute to deal with the serious problem 
of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners. E. g., Rich-
ardson, supra; cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U. S. 483 (1955). Nor does the Constitution require 
that legislation on economic matters be compatible with 
sound economics or even with normal fairness. As a re,, 
sult, economic and remedial social enactments carry a 
strong presumption of constitutionality, e. g. , United' 
States v. Carolene Products Co. , 304 U. S. 144, 148 
(1938) , and the Operators had the heavy burden of 
showing the Act to be unconstitutional. 
8 In addition, the inoiqence of liability to former miners may be· 
skewed artificially by the regulation imposing liability upon the com-
pany which last employed the claimant without regard to previous 
employment with other companies. 20 CFR § 725.311 (197j) . The-
validity oJ t.bitl reg_ulat\m i:.e_mams. tQ be. cQlls,i.dered, See ante, at 
~to.. 




8 N MINING CO. 
The constitutionality of the retr ctive liability in ~ 
question here ultimately turns on the histicated ques- ~
tions of economic fact suggested above, n this casex•a-e-- ---, J 
cided on the Government's motion for summary judgment, , / 
the Operators have failed to make 1,f actual showings ~ 
that support their sweeping assertions of irrational-
ity. Although I find these assertions strongly sugges-
tive that Congress has acted irrationally in pursuing a 
legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they are suffi-
. nt-in the absence of appropriate factual support--
to override the presumption of constitutionality. Ac-
cordingly, I agree that the Government was entitled to 
summary judgment on this record, 
5, b, i 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Appellants in No. 74-1316, the Operators, challenge as 
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on 
them by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Bene-
fits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. 
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV 
of its opinion. I concur in the judgment as to Part IV, 
and concur in other portions of the opinion not inconsist-
ent with the views herein expressed. 
I 
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the 
United States until the 1950's, and there was no federal 
74---1302 & 74---1316-CONCUR 
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legislation providing benefits to its victims until the 
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of the 
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights 
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard 
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to com-
pensate victims of pneumoconiosis.1 Under Title IV 
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect 
benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411-414, 30 
U. S. C. §§ 921- 924.2 Miners filing cl~ims after June 30, 
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981, see ante, at 21- 22, 
n. 24, from their individual employers. § 415, 421-431, 
30 U.S. C. §§ 925, 931-941.8 Under the statute, the class 
of claimants to which individual employers are liable in-
cludes both (i) miners employed at the time of or after 
enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the 
industry at the time of enactment ("former miners") . 
The unprecedented feature of the Act is that miners 
may be eligible to receive benefits from a particular coal-
mining concern even if the miner was no longer em-
ployed in the industry at the time of · enactment. The 
Department of Labor already has made initial deter-
minations of liability against one of the Operators and 
1 Title II of the Act pre.5cribes the maintenance of less hazardous 
mine conditions in the future. § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841 et 
seq. 
2 As does the Court, I simplify by not distinguishing between 
claims by employees and claims by their survivors. See ante, at 10 
n. 13. 
8 Claims filed between July 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, were 
to be paid by the Federal Government until December 31, 1973, after 
which they became the responsibility of individual mining concerns. 
§ 415, 30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining 
concerns arises only if the claimant docs not have recourse to an ap-
plicable state workmen's compensation program approved by the 
Secreta.ry of Labor, §§ 421-422, 30 U. S. C. §§ 931-932, but no such 
state programs have been approved. See ante, at 4---5, 
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m favor of claimants whose employment terminated 
decades ago.4 
II 
The Operators do not challenge their liability to miners 
employed at the time of or aft.er enactment, a liability 
which accords with familiar principles of workmen's 
compensation. 5 They contend, howeyer, that a statu-
tory liability to former miners has been imposed in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbi-
trary, irrational, or discriminatory legislation, see, e. g., 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S . . 78, 81 (1971), as there 
is no rational justification for imposing liability to 
former miners upon individual mine owners., 
The Court recognizes that its evaluation of the ra-
4 Favorable initial determinations have been made for claimants 
who left mine work in 1923, 1927, 1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, 1946, 
and 1948. Brief for Operators, 30 n. 1. The,,e determinations 
rebut the Government's s~ggestion that in combination the initial 
period of federal liability and the statute of limitations specified in 
§ 422 (f) ( 1), 30 U. S. C. § 932 (f) ( 1), will prevent employer lia-
bility to miners who left the industry before passnge of the Act. 
See ante, at 11-12, n. 14 . 
.'i Congress apparently recognized that the employers burdened 
by retroactive liability were not blameworthy. Senator Ja.vits, who 
played a significant role in the deYelopment of individual-employer 
liability, see Brief for Opera.tors, at 34, thought that the "blame" 
for past neglect must be shared by "aU of us," including "the in-
dustry, the medical profes8ion, and the Government-particularly 
the Public Health Service." House Comm. on Education and Labor, 
Legislative History /Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 338 
(Comm. Print 1970) (floor remarks) . 
The retroactive nature of the liability makes deterrence an in-
sufficient justification. In their prospective application, it is ra-
tional for Title IV and other workmen's compensation schemes to 
disadvantage competitively employers who take less effective pre-
cautions to protect their employees. But only prospective liability 
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tionality of the employers' challenged liability must take 
into account the retroactive nature of the liability: · 
"The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well 
as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due 
process, and the justifications for the latter may not 
suffice for the former. Thus, in this case the justifi-
ca.tion for the retrospective imposition of liability 
must take into account the possibilities that the 
Operators may not have knO\vn of the danger of 
their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and 
that even if they did know of the danger their con-
duct may have been taken in reliance upon the 
current state of the law .... " Ante, at 12-13. 
The Court then acknowledges that the Act would not be 
justified "on any theory of deterrence ... or blame-
worthiness." Id., at 13. It nonetheless sustains the 
provision for retroactive liability, reasoning as follows: 
"We find ... that the imposition of liability for 
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified 
as a rational measure to spread the costs of the em-
ployees' disabilities to those who have profited from 
the fruits of their labor-the operators and the coal 
consumers." Id., at 13- 14. 
"We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress' 
chosen scheme by examining the degree to which the 
'cost-savings' enjoyed by operators in the pre-enact-
ment period produced 'excess' profits, or the degree 
to which the retrospective liability imposed on the 
early operators can now be passed on to the con-
sumer. It is enough to say that the Act approa.ches 
the problem of cost-spreading rationally .... " / d., 
at 14-15. 





74-1302 & 74-1316-CONCUR 
USERY v. TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO. 5 
tutional is a considerably closer question than the Court's 
treatment suggests. The rationality of retrospective lia-
bility as a cost-spreading device is highly questionable . 
If coal mining concerns actually enjoyed "excess" 
profits in the pre-enactment period by virtue of their 
nonliability for pneumoconiosis, and if such profits could 
be quantified in some discernible way, Congress ration- \ 
ally could impose retrospective liability for the benefit 
of the miners concerned. But, in this context, the term 
"excess profits" must mean profits over and above 
those that Operators would have made in yea.rs and 
decades past if they had set aside from current op-
erations funds sufficient to provide compensation, al-
though under no obligation to do so. It is unlikely 
that such profits existed. The coal industry is highly 
competitive and prices normally are determined by mar-
ket forces. One therefore "·ould expect that, had a 
compensation increment been added to operating costs, 
the Operators over the long term simply would have 
passed most of it on to consumers, thereby leaving 
their profitability relatively unaffected. In short, the 
talk of "excess profits" in any realistic sense is wholly 
speculative. 
Nor can I accept without serious question the Court's 
view that the costs now imposed by the Act may be 
passed on to consumers. Firms burdened with retro-
active payments must meet that expense from current 
production and current sales in a market where prices 
must be competitive with the prices of firms not so 
burdened. One ordinarily would expect that if burdened 
firms are to meet both competitive prices and their retro-
active obligations, their profits necessarily will be less 
than those of their competitors. Thus, the burdened 
firms in all likelihood will have to bear the costs of the 
retroactive liability rather than passing those costs on 
74--1302 & 74--1316-CONCUR 
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to consumers. And they must bear such costs quite 
without regard to whether "-excess profits" may have 
been made in some earlier years.6 
In some industries conditions might be such that the \ 
cost of retroactively imposed benefits could be spread 
to consumers. It seems most unlikely, however, that 
the coal industry is such an industry. A notable fact 
about coal mining is that the industry curr-ently employs 
only about 150,000 persons, whereas in 1939 it employed 
nearly 450,000. Brief for Operators 24. The reduced 
scale of employment in the coal industry, combined with 
the liability to former miners and their survivors, means 
that retroactive obligations almost certainly will be dis-
proportionate to the scale of current operations.1 More-
over, it is unlikely that liability to former miners will be 
distributed randomly across the industry, as it is dictated 
by historical patterns that may be wholly unrelated to the 
present contours of the industry. Two examples are il-
lustrative: (i) Some coal-mining concerns have been in 
the mining business for decades, while some competitors 
have commenced operation more recently. The exposure 
of the former group to cla.ims of employees long separated 
from active employment is likely to be significantly 
greater than that of their competitors. (ii) Some com-
6 It is, of course, impossible to spread the cost to "coal consumers" 
who "profited from the fruits of [former employees'] labor." Ante, 
at 14. A coal mining concern cannot retroactively increase its prices 
to the former customers who benefitted from the pre-1969 labors 
of former miners. The only consumers, therefore, who could bear 
these burdens are those who purch_ase coal currently. But in a 
free market such customers cannot be expected to pay a reparation 
add-on for coal produced by disadvantaged coal companies when the 
same product is readily obtainable from others at a lower price. 
7 Indeed, the number of former miners and survivors whom an 
individual employer is obliged to compensate could be larger than 
the employer's present workforce. 
. . 
'• 
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panies engaged in coal mining in years past on a much 
larger scale and with many more employees than cur-
rently. This is not an unusual situation in a "depleting 
asset" industry, where smaller companies often lack the 
resources with which to continue the acquisition ·and de-
velopment of new properties. Stronger competitors, on 
the other hand, may have operated on a constant or an 
increasingly large scale.8 In each case the competitively 
disadvantaged companies may be unable to spread a 
substantial portion of their costs to consumers. In view 
of these considerations it is unrealistic to think that the 
Act will spread costs to "the operators and the coal con-
sumers," ante, at 14, and thus I question the Court's 
conclusion that the Act is rational in imposing retro-
active liability. 
III 
Despite the foregoing, I must concur in the judgment 
on the record before us. Congress had broad discretion 
in formulating a statute to deal with the serious problem 
of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners. E. g., Rich-
ardson, supra; cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U. S. 483 (1955). Nor does the Constitution require 
that legisla.tion on economic matters be compatible with 
sound economics or even with normal fairness. As a re-
sult, economic and remedial social enactments ca.rry a 
strong presumption of constitutionality, e. g., United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 148 
(1938), and the Operators had the heavy burden of 
showing the Act to be unconstitutional. 
8 In addition, the incidence of liability to former miners may be 
skewed artificially by the regulation imposing liability upon the com-
pany which last employed the claimant without regard to previous 
rmployment with other companies. 20 CFR § 725.311 (1976), The 
validity of this regulation remains to be considered. See a~te, at 
9-10. 
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The constitutionality of the retrospective liability in 
question here ultimately turns on the sophisticated ques-
tions of economic fact suggested above, and these facts 
are likely to vary widely among the Operators.9 In this 
case, however, decided on the Government's inotion for 
summary judgment, the Operators have failed to make 
any factual showings that support their sweeping asser-
tions of irrationality. Although I find these assertions 
strongly suggestive that Congress has acted irrationally 
in pursuing a legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they 
are sufficient- in the absence of appropriate factual sup-
port-to override the presumption of constitutionality. 
Accordingly, I agree that the Government was entitled 
.to summary judgment on this record. 
9 I would not foreclose the possibility that a particular coal mining l 
concern, in a proper case, may be able to show that the impact of 
the Act on its operations is irrational. Cf. ante, at 22. 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Appellants in No. 74-1316, the Operators, challenge as 
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on 
them by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Bene-
fits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq, 
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV 
of its opinion. I concur in the judgment as to Part IV, 
and concur in other portions of the opinion not inconsis~ 
ent with the views herein expressed. 
I 
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the 
United States until the 1950's, and there was no federal 
'. 
., .. 
, . .. 
-; 
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legislation providing benefits to its victims until the 
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of th~ 
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights 
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard 
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to com-
pensate victims of pneumoconiosis.1 Under Title IV 
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect 
\ benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411-414, 30 
U. S. C. §§ 921-924.2 Miner~ filing claims after June 30, 
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981, see ante, at 21-22, 
h. 24, from their individual employers. § 415, 421-43.1,, 
30 U. S. C. §§ 925, 931-941.3 Under the statute, the class 
6f claimants to which individual employers are liable in-_. 
eludes both (i) miners employed at the time of or after . 
enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the 
industry at the time of enactment ("former miners"). .,, 
The unprecedented feature of the Act is that miners 
inay be eligible to receive benefits from a particular coal~ 
mining concern even if the miner was no longer em--
ployed in the industry at the time of enactment. The 
Department of Labor already has made initial deter-, 
minations of liability against one of the Operators and 
1 Title II of the Act prescribes the µiaintenance of less hazardou~ t 
mine conditions jn the future. § 201 et seq., ·30 u'. S. C. § 841 et 
seq. ' . · · ··i , , ·, 
2 As does the Court, l simplify by not distinguishing between 1 
claims by employees and clahils by their ~urvivor~. See ante, at 10 
n! 13. . . . -,) . .. . . , 
8 Clahns filed b~tween' July 1, 197:3,'and'December 31, 1973, were . 
to be paid by the Federal Government until December 31, 1973, after · 
w~ich they became the , responsibility of individual mining concerns .. . 
§ 415, 30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining . 
concerns arises only if the. claimant does not have recourse to an ap .. , 
pfJcable state workmen's compen~_ation program approved by the· l 
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in favor of claimants whose employment terminated 
decades ago.4 
II 
The Operators do not challenge their liability to miners 
employed at the time of or after enactment, a liability 
which accords with familiar principles of workmen's 
·compensation. 5 They contend, however, that a statu-
tory liability to former miners has been imposed in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbi-
trary, irrational, or discriminatory legislation, see, e. g., 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971), as there 
is no rational justification for imposing liability to 
former miners upon individual mine owners., 
The Court recognizes that its evaluation of the ra-
4 Favorable initial determinations have been made for claimants 
who left mine work in 1923, 1927, 1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, 1946, 
and 1948. Brief for Operators, 30 n. 1. These determinations 
rebut the Government's suggestion that in combination the initial 
period of federal liability and ·the statute of limitations specified in 
§422 (f)(l), 30 U.S. C. §932 (f)(l), will prevent employer lia-
bility to miners who left the industry, before passage of the Act. 
See ante, at 11-12, n. 14. 
5 Congress apparently recognized that the employers burdened 
by retroactive liability were not blameworthy. Senator Javits, who 
played a significant role in the developm_ent of individual-employer 
liability, see Brief for Operators, at 34, thought that the "blame" 
tor past neglect must be shared by "all of us," including "the in-
dustry, the medical profession, and the Government-particularly 
the Public Health Service." House Comm. on Education and Labor, 
Legislative History /Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 338' 
(Comm. Print 1070) (floor remarks). 
The retroactive nature of the liability makes deterrence an in-
sufficient justification. In their prospective applicatio11, it is ra-
tional for Title IV and other workmen's compensation schemes to, 
disadvantage competitively employers who take less effective pre-
ca.utions to protect their employees. But only prospective liability 
'Crea.tes. an incentive for oocupa.tional safety uooasures. 
'" 
.,, 
l l .,, 
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tionality of the employers' challenged liability must take 
into account the retroactive nature of the liability : 
"The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well 
as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due 
process, and the justifications for the latter may not 
suffice for the former. Thus, in this case the justifi-
cation for the retrospective imposition of liability 
must take into account the possibilities that the 
Operators may not have known of the danger of 
their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and 
that even if they did know of the danger their con-
duct may have been taken in reliance upon the 
current state of the law .... " Ante, at 12-13. 
The Court then acknowledges that the Act would not be 
justified "on any theory of deterrence ... or blame-
worthiness." Id., at 13. It nonetheless sustains the 
provision for retroactive liability, reasoning as follows : 
"We find . . . that the imposition of liability for 
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified 
as a rational measure to spread the costs of the em-
ployees' disabilities to those who have profited from 
the fruits of their labor-the operators and the coal 
consumers." Id., at 13-14. 
"We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress1 
chosen scheme by examining the degree to which the 
'cost-savings' enjoyed by operators in the pre-enact-
ment period produced 'excess' profits, or the degree 
to which the retrospective liability imposed on the 
early operators can now be passed on to the con-
sumer. It is enough to say that the Act approaches 
the problem of cost-spreading rationally ... . " Id., 
at 14--15. 
In my view whether the retroactive liability is consti-
,,_ 
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1tutional is a considerably closer question than the Court's 
treatment suggests. The rationality of retrospective lia-
bility as a cost-spreading device is highly questionable. 
If coal mining concerns actually enjoyed "excess" 
profits in the pre-enactment period by virtue of their 
nonliability for pneumoconiosis, and if such profits could 
be quantified in some discernible way, Congress ration-
ally could impose retrospective liability for the benefit 
of the miners concerned. But, in tpis context, the term 
"excess profits" must mean profits over and above 
those that Operators would have made in years and 
decades past if they had set aside from current op-
erations funds sufficient to provide compensation, al-
though under no oblig_ation to do so. It is unlikely 
that such profits existed. The coal industry is highly 
competitive and prices norma.lly are determined by mar-
ket forces. One therefore would expect that, had a 
compensation increment been added to operating costs, 
the Operators over the long term simply would have 
passed most of it on to consumers, thereby leaving 
their profitability relatively unaffected. In short, the 
talk of "excess profits" in any realistic sense is wholly 
speculative. 
Nor can I accept without serious question the Court's 
view that the costs now imposed by the Act may be 
passed on to consumers. Firms burdened with retro-
active payments must meet that expense from current 
production and current sales in a ma.rket where prices 
must be competitive with the prices of firms not so 
burdened. One ordinarily would expect that if burdened 
firms are to meet both competitive prices and their retro-
active obligations, their profits necessarily will be less 
than those of their competitors. Thus, the burdened 
firms in all likelihood will have to bear the costs of th~ 
retroactive liability rather than passirig those costs on 
... 
' . 
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to consumers. And they must bear such costs quite 
without regard to whether "excess profits" may have 
been made in some earlier years.6 
In some industries conditions might be such that the 
cost of retroactively imposed benefits could be spread 
to <;:onsumers. It seems most unlikely, however, that 
the coal industry is such an industry. A notable fact 
about coal mining is' that the industry currently employs 
only about 150,000 persons, whereas in 1939 it employed 
nearly 450,000. Brief for Operators 24. The reduced 
scale of employment in the coal industry, combined with 
the liability to former miners and their survivors, means 
that retroactive obligations almost certainly will be dis-
proportionate to the scale of current operations.7 More-
over, it is unlikely that liability to former miners will be 
distributed randomly across the industry, as it is dictated 
by historical patterns that may be wholly unrelated to the 
present contours of the industry. Two examples are il-
lustrative: (i) Some coal-mining concerns have been in 
the mining business for decades, while some competitors 
have commenced operation more recently. The exposure 
of the former group to cla.ims of employees long separated 
from active employment is likely to be significantly 
greater than that of their competitors. (ii) Some com- . 
6 It is, of course, impossible to spread the cost to "coal consumers" 
who "profited from the fruits of [former employees'] labor." Ante, 
at 14. A coal mining concern cannot retroactively increase its prices. 
to the former customers who benefitted from the pre-1969 labors 
of former miners. The only consumers, therefore, who could bear 
these burdens are those who purchase coal currently. But in a 
free market such customers cannot be expected to pay a reparation 
add-on for coal produced by disadvantaged coal companies when the 
same product is readily obtainable from others at a lower price. 
7 Indeed, the number of former miners and survivors whom an 
individual employer is obliged to compensate could be larger than 
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-panies engaged in coal mining in years past on a much 
larger scale and with many more employees than cur-
rently. This is not an unusual situation in a "depleting 
asset" industry, where smaller companies often lack the 
resources with which to continue the acquisition and de-
velopment of new properties. Stronger competitors, on 
the other hand, may have operated on a constant or an 
increasingly large scale.8 In each case the competitively 
disadvantaged companies may be unable to spread a 
substantial portion of their costs to consumers. In view 
of these considerations it is unrealistic to think that the 
Act will spread costs to "the operators and the coal con-
sumers," ante, at 14, and thus I question the Court's 
conclusion that the Act is rational in imposing retro-
active liability. 
III 
Despite the foregoing, I must concur in the judgment 
on the record before us. Congress had broad discretion 
in formulating a statute to deal with the serious problem 
of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners. E. g., Rich-
ardson, su:pra; cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U. S. 483 (1955). Nor does the Constitution 'require 
that legislation on economic matters be compatible with 
sound economics or even with normal fairness. As a re-
sult, economic and remedial social enactments ca.rry a 
strong presumption of constitutionality, e. g., United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 148 
(l938), and the Operators had the heavy burden of 
showing the Act to be unconstitutional. 
8 In addition, the incidence of liability to former mi1'ers may be 
skewed artificially by the regulation imposing liability upon the com-
pany which last employed the claimant without regard to previous 
employment with other companies. 20 CFR § 725.311 (1!}76) , The 
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The constitutionality of the retrospective liability in· 
question here ultimately turns on the sophisticated ques-
tions of economic fact suggested above, and these facts 
are likely to vary widely among the Operators.1l In this 
pase, however, decided on the Government's motion for 
summary judgment, the Operators have failed to make 
~ny factual showings that support their sweeping asser-
tions of irrationality. Although I find these assertions 
strongly suggestive that Congress has acted irrationally 
in pursuing a legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they 
ltre sufficient-in the absence of appropriate factual sup-
port-to override the presumption of constitutionality. 
Accordingly, I agree that the Government was entitled 
to summary judgment on this record. 
9 I would not foreclose the possibility that a particular coal mining; 
concern, in a proper case, may be able to show that the impact of 
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